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NOTE ON CALENDAR AND CURRENCY
In this study, all of the yearly dates on Iran are 
stated as though they refer to the first portion of the ap­
plicable Iranian year. For example, 1959, should be written 
as Fiscal Year (PY) 1959-1960 (21 March 1959-20 March 1960) 
which in turn is 1338 in Iran. Hence, the Gregorian date 
less 621 equals the Iranian calendar year, which begins 
March 21 and ends March 20.*
Iranian currency of Rials (Rls.) is used in most parts 
of this study. In 1957, the par value of the Rial was estab­
lished with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at 75.75 
Rials for U.S. $1. This par value remained in effect until
1972. In February 1975, the Rial was pegged to SDR (special
drawing right) instead of the U.S. dollars. Since 1972, the 
rial/dollar exchange rate varied. For example, it was Rls 
68.88 = U.S. $1 in 1973, Rls 67.62 = U.S. $1 in 1974, Rls
67.64 = U.S. $1 in 1975, Rls 70.22 = U.S. $1 in 1976, and
Rls 70.62 = U.S. $1 through September 1977.
Metric system is used in Iran, and it is employed in 
this study for all weights and measures, unless otherwise 
indicated.
*
The first day of Farvardin, New Year's Day, is March 21.
Some of the metric equivalents used in the preparation 
of this study are;
1 kilogramme = 2.204622 pounds 
1 pound = 0.45359 kilogramme 
1 metric ton (1,000 kgs.) = 2.204.622 pounds 
1 metric ton = 36.7437 bushels wheat 
1 bushel wheat (60 lb.) = 0.027216 metric ton 
1 hectare = 2.471 acres
The metric ton of 2,204.622 pounds is the weight unit 
most widely used in reporting international trade statistics. 
Other tons include:
1 short ton = 2,000 pounds
1 long ton (also called the gross ton, shipper's ton, 
or shipping ton) = 2,240 pounds
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Most development theories have been concerned with 
investigating the basic factors that cause the economic de­
velopment of agriculture in the less developed countries 
(LDCs) and the way in which agricultural production and pro­
ductivity can be increased. Thus, a primary concern for 
these countries is to determine the major factors which con­
tribute to their agricultural development.
In most of the LDCs, agriculture is the dominant econo­
mic sector. It is the main source of employment, foreign 
exchange, food and industrial raw material. Hence, it deserves 
heavy weight in any development program. Also, increases in 
agricultural output and productivity are essential to per 
capita income growth in today's developing nations. Accord­
ing to Heady, technological advance of agriculture with the 
improvement of food supply is a necessary precondition for 
take-off in economic development for any developing nation
1
in the world.^ Of course, in the process of economic develop­
ment, the non-agricultural sectors must grow at a substantially 
more rapid rate than the agricultural sector if, in the long- 
run, there is to be a diminishing share of agriculture in 
output. In fact, there has been a great structural change 
away from agriculture in favor of manufacturing and other 
sectors in most countries. In many countries, for example 
Iran, this shift has been slowed, because of the prevailing 
low productivity in agriculture. A result is that the rate 
of increase in agricultural production in general, and food 
supply in particular, falls short of the rate of growth of 
population, and, unless the past rate of growth in food pro­
duction can be increased substantially, net imports of food 
in future years will occur. This would involve a heavy 
drain of scarce foreign exchange in most LDCs. Hence, the 
slow increase in food production may create serious obstacles 
to general economic development. The availability of the 
American food aid has considerably reduced the food and 
foreign exchange shortages of some countries like Israel, 
and Taiwan, and helped these countries to achieve a sound 
record of growth and development.
Of course, the capital requirements for overall econo­
mic development are extremely large. According to Mellor,
^Earl 0. Heady, A Primer on Food, Agriculture and Public 
Policy, (New York: Random House Inc., 1967), p. 32.
sources of capital for economic development are foreign aid, 
foreign commercial investment, and domestic saving. Foreign 
aid in the form of food aid can play a significant role in 
providing capital formation if it is wisely used. Increasing 
productivity in agriculture requires capital. Food as aid 
can be considered as extra capital available to recipient 
nations and hence can be used as a means to increase agricul-
Otural productivity. Such increase in agricultural production 
provides the basis for increased income and capital formation 
in the agriculture sector.
Aid in commodity form creates special problems. Through 
accepted regulations of international trade, reexporting the 
commodity aid generally is prohibited. Hence, the recipient 
must utilize all of the aid domestically. On one hand, if 
the aid displaces the recipient's domestic production or
2John W. Mellor, The Economics of Agricultural Develop­
ment, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 82.
3Food aid can be used in different ways with beneficial 
results. For example, it can be substituted for commercial 
imports of food called for in a national development plan, 
thus releasing scarce foreign exchange for the importation of 
other producer goods called for in the plan. In this case, 
food aid constitutes an additional resource. Of course, 
agricultural development is dependent upon general economic 
development. Food aid that contributes to and supports general 
economic development and the production of the producer goods 
required by a 'modernized agriculture' thus contributes to in­
creased agricultural productivity. For more detail on this 
point and the benefits from food aid see: Ibid., pp. 112-13,
and U.S., Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 
P.L. 480 Concessional Sales: History, Procedures, Negotiating
and Implementing Agreements, Foreign Agricultural Economic 
Report No. 142, (Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office,
December 1977), p. 12.
lowers domestic market prices of the commodity received as 
aid, it imposes losses on some of the recipient's own nationals. 
On the other hand, if the aid displaces commercial imports of 
the recipient, then a third country suffers a loss. The im­
position of losses may also make the net benefits of the aid 
questionable and prevent the attainment of a Pareto optimum^ 
with respect to commodity aid. Also, losses may result in 
undesirable income distribution.
Within the past twenty-five to thirty years, the 
Iranian economy has been greatly transformed. From a basic 
agrarian economy in the immediate post World War II period 
has emerged a modern economy in which agriculture plays a 
minor role. Mining and industrial sectors have become the 
most important sectors of the new economy.
Although lower growth rates in the agricultural sector 
were more than compensated for by the rest of the economy to 
produce a satisfactory overall growth rate but, in the past 
few years, it became evident that rising growth rate in oil 
revenue were not a total substitute for those in agriculture.
The relative failures of the agricultural sector of the 
Iranian economy, as compare! with the rapid growth in other 
sectors, caused the development planners to adopt a series of 
measures (strategies) which were expected to force modernization
4A Pareto optimum means that some individuals in the 
recipient country benefit while no one in that country or 
third countries suffers a loss.
of agriculture in such a way that would make the country self- 
sufficient in the food production. But the past development 
plans have failed to reach even many of their modest goals 
in this sector of the economy, and there were shortages in 
nearly all farm products. Thus, the failure of the past 
plans, along with the adverse weather conditions, forced the 
country to import most of its foodstuffs, especially wheat—  
Iran's main food staple. Generally speaking, since 1956, most 
of Iran's wheat import needs have been supplied by P.L. 480 
shipments from the United States.
Some of the Issues on Commodity Aid
Most commodity aid studies concern P.L. 480 aid from 
the U.S. because that is by far the largest source. These 
studies have concentrated on food commodities.
On one hand, most criticisms of the negative effects 
of commodity aid, which have appeared time and time again in 
past studies, claimed that this form of the aid displaces 
commercial production either by reducing the recipient's 
domestic output (because the recipient's production is price 
responsive) or decreasing its commercial imports. Most 
studies have viewed the effect of commodity aid on the com­
mercial market by comparing changes in price and quantity 
variables over time. In other words, the price and quantity 
of domestic production and commercial imports for a period 
prior to the aid have been compared with those during a period 
of the aid. On the other hand, other studies, who argued that
the recipient's production is not price responsive, claimed 
that food aid has little negative effect because domestic 
output does not reduce. Hence, the following two contrasting 
positions relative to the role of food aid to needy nations 
can be formulated:
1. Food aid programs can be used to help to increase 
food production in LDCs, and ,
2. Food aid exerts downward pressured on prices and, 
thus, acts as a disincentive to increase agricul­
tural output.
Because available studies support both positions, and 
because of the renewed interest in food aid as a form of 
development assistance since 1961, a better understanding of 
the merits and disadvantages of this form of aid appears to 
be essential.
Objectives of This Study
There have been both theoretical arguments and empir­
ical demonstrations of the negative effects of commodity aid. 
The major concern of this study is to provide and estimate 
the direct economic effects of the American food aid program—  
U.S. surplus agricultural commodities under Public Law 480—  
on Iran's domestic foodgrain production for the period of
1958-1973.^ Such knowledge is of value to policymakers in 
the recipient countries. For example, if P.L. 480 shipments 
cause large production shortfalls in the future, one policy
will be implied, and if it causes little or no reduction in
the future production, then a different policy is called for. 
Hence, the second objective is to give a brief commentary on 
how the qonclusions of this study are applicable to Iran's 
economic development agricultural policy. Particular attention 
is focused on the following questions:
a. What was the effect of the American wheat aid pro­
gram under P.L. 480 on domestic wheat production 
in Iran? This effect is called the output effect
b. What was the effect of the program on domestic
wheat prices in Iran? This effect is called the
price effect, and
c. What were the implications of "a" and "b" for 
development plans in Iran? This effect is called 
the policy effect.
Iran is chosen because she is one of the major agricultural
For the purpose of this study, foodgrains are those 
grains or grain equivalents (Prepared products which include 
grains, such as rolled wheat and cornmeal) which are intended 
for human consumption. This is similar to the United Nations 
Standard International Trade Classification scheme for cereals. 
The term foodgrains thus includes wheat, wheat flour, rice, 
corn, rye, barley, sorghum, millet, and oats, see F.M. Shalaby, 
"An Evaluation of the Contribution of United States Public 
Law 480 to the Food Grains Trade, Consumption, and Production 
of the Less Developed Countries," (Ph.D. dissertation. The 
Oklahoma State University, 1972), pp. 14-15.
producers of West Asia, and has also been a major recipient 
of P.L. 480 shipments.^ But so far, research efforts on the 
effects of the American food aid under P.L. 480 have com­
pletely ignored Iran, and have focused particularly on India 
and Pakistan.
One reason wheat is chosen among foodgrains is that 
"wheat is the most important commodity disposed under P.L. 
480, accounting for over 50 percent of the value of all P.L.
7480 exports." A second reason for choosing wheat is the 
importance of this foodgrain to its producers and consumers 
in Iran and its economic, political and social significance 
to the government. While the Iranian government has declared 
a policy goal of becoming self-sufficient in the production of 
wheat and improving the incomes of rural people, the demand 
for wheat has outstripped the domestic supply. Thus, wheat
Total market value of shipments 'only' under Title I 
from the period of 1955 through December 31, 1973 was $139.8 
million, of this, $96.3 million was for wheat and wheat pro­
ducts. Note that 1954 was the year that the P.L. 480 pro­
gram became operational in the United States. On February 20, 
1956 the government of Iran signed the first P.L. 480 Title I 
agreement. The market value of the agreement was $9,962,000 
excluding transportation costs, see: U.S., Department of
Agriculture, 1973 Annual Report on Public Law 480, 93-362 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974), Table
10, p. 78, and U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1978 Annual 
Report on Public Law 480; Concessional Sales Agreements Signed 
Through December 31, 1977, 1004-12 (Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1978) , p. 1.
^Malcolm Purvis, "Some Observations on the Effects of 
P.L. 480 Wheat Sales," Journal of Farm Economics, 45 (November 
1963): 858.
is chosen for the analysis because it has been the major
Ocereal imported under P.L. 480.
The reasons that the period 1958-73 has been chosen 
are several. Beginning in 1962, a series of drastic measures 
were adopted by the Iranian government to restructure the 
traditional nature of the agricultural sector. A major land 
reform program (January, 1962) was initiated with the express 
purpose of breaking the old feudal structure of the land 
tenure system and eventually making farmers the owners of 
the lands they cultivated. The Third and Fourth Five-Year 
Plans (1962-1972) included massive public expenditures for 
the construction of a series of dams and irrigation networks 
increasing the supply of water for agriculture. There were 
also simultaneous efforts through legal and long range planning 
to force modernization and mechanization of agriculture by 
concentrating on the development of large, agribusiness type 
farms.
With the above objectives in mind, this study will 
test the hypothesis that increased supplies of wheat under 
P.L. 480 shipments in the face of rather stable demand will 
have a depressing effect on domestic wheat prices, which, in 
turn, will tend to depress domestic wheat production.
OWheat and wheat flour play an important role in the 
diet of the average Iranian citizen. Per-capita consumption 
of 120.5 kilograms is one of the highest in the world which 
is more than 85 percent of per-capita consumptions of all 
cereals. See: Sayeed Mehdi Shafaedin, Economics of Cereal and
Flour in Iran, (Tehran, Iran: University of Tehran, 1971), p. 98.
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An acceptance or rejection of the above hypothesis 
would be a contribution to economic knowledge in that it 
would result in further insights into the function of food 
aid within the framework of developmental economics. It 
is hoped that the analysis and the results of this study will 
be of some value in planning and implementing national pro­
grams of agricultural development toward more effective 
utilization of Iranian agricultural resources in the years 
ahead. It is also hoped that this study will encourage 
further related research about Iran.
Organization of This Study
The analysis of this study is carried out under two 
main parts. The first part investigates the basic develop­
ment of Iran's agriculture. The second part analyzes the 
impact of P.L. 480 wheat imports upon Iran's agricultural and 
economic development.
The remaining chapters of this study are organized as 
follows;
Chapter II contains a review of P.L. 480, and a review 
of the literature. The major purposes of the review of the 
literature are: (a) to find out what work, both theoretical
and empirical, has been done in the area of analytic concern, 
and (b) to provide a foundation for a theoretical framework.
In Chapter III, the geography of Production and some 
of the physical aspects of wheat production are discussed. 
Included is a general description of the cropping pattern, 
fallow, growing methods, and farm size.
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Chapter IV discusses the role of wheat in the Iranian 
economy. The discussion covers wheat production, consumption, 
and trade. Included is a review of past development plans—  
with special emphasis on the third and the fourth national 
development plans— and agricultural policies of the Iranian 
government. The discussion of each topic is, of necessity, 
brief; though the more important topics are discussed in 
greater detail.
The major portion of Chapter V is concerned with the 
construction of a food aid model. After a short discussion 
of the place of model building in economic analysis, the 
first section of the chapter discusses the supply analysis 
and the construction of the production model. The second 
section is concerned with demand analysis. The information 
resulting from the development of the supply and demand 
analysis will be incorporated into a food aid model in sec­
tion three of this chapter. Included in this section is the 
development of a theoretical framework for the food aid model.
Chapter VI is concerned with the application of the 
food aid model and the economic effects of wheat imports under 
the American food aid program. In particular, it deals with 
the effects of wheat aid on domestic wheat production, and 
domestic wehat prices.
In the final chapter, basic conclusions of the study 
are summarized. Included in this chapter is a brief commentary 




Most of the world's food aid has been distributed 
through bilateral programs of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. In general, 
seventeen OECD countries provided food aid and, except for 
the United States and Japan, all distribute their food aid 
entirely as grants. The non-European donors— the United 
States, Canada, Japan, and Australia— have supplied most of 
their food aid bilaterally, while European donors have 
generally contributed the majority of their aid through the 
World Food Program (WFP) and/or the regional European Com­
munity (EC) organization.
Grains, mainly wheat, have accounted for most OECD 
food aid, and the food Aid Convention (created through the 
International Wheat Agreement of 1967) obligates various 
major producers to provide minimum annual amounts of aid in 
grains. Nongrain food aid of OECD countries has been primarily 
skim milk powder and soybean oil and small amounts of butter oil.
US., Department of Agriculture, Economic Researcy 
Service, Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, 




A Short Review of Public Law 480 
Although a detailed study of the foreign food aid 
history of the United States is not the concern of this study, 
a brief statement of some of the motivations to legislation
9will be made. Generally speaking, in the late 1940's (before 
the Korean War) and early 1950's (after the war), as a result 
of different forces - a slow shift in demand for and a rela­
tively rapid shift in supply of agricultural commodities, the 
relative immobility of basic resources in agriculture, and 
the balance of political power - substantial quantities of 
agricultural commodities have been available for export on 
concessionary terms in this country. Hence, the United States 
developed and pursued the policy of shipping surplus foods to 
needy nations, provided these shipments did not displace 
normal commercial sales and were in addition to the food that 
the needy countries regularly bought through commercial 
channels.
The above idea was embodied in the Agricultural Trade 
Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (called Public Law 480)^
2For a good discussion about the role of the United 
States in dealing with the post-World War II food problems of 
Western Europe, see: A.J. Matusow, Farm Policies and Politics
in the Truman Years, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1967), Chapter 7. Also, for a good discussion of the 
law (both historical and background and issues), see: F.M.
Shalaby, "An Evaluation of the Contribution of United States 
Public Law 480 to the Food Grain Trade, Consumption, and 
Production of the Less Developed Countries," (Ph.D. disserta­
tion, The Oklahoma State University, 1972), Chapter 3.
^Note that Food for Peace, the Food Aid Program, and 
Food for Freedom are all names for Public Law 480.
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which authorized the donation of food to international relief 
organizations such as V3FP, and the sale of food to needy 
countries for the non-convertible currency of those countries. 
Since the 1954's P.L. 480 has supplied food aid to more than 
130 countries, of which 100 were developing nations.*
Public Law 480 was created primarily as a temporary 
measure to bypass foreign exchange shortages of foreign na­
tions and to dispose of U.S. surpluses. Since its inception 
in July 1954, there have been several changes in the program's 
laws, priorities, commodity content, and recipient destina­
tions.^ The basic attitude toward foreign food aid began to 
change in 1961 and the belief that food aid would be used to 
support general economic development or project development 
gained strength during the Johnson administration. By 1967, 
the program was moving in the direction of serving as a 
catalytic agent to induce development efforts on the part of 
the developing nations.
P.L. 480 has been operated under four titles, and in 
general, the titles cover the following aspects:
U.S., Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service, Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1977),
p. 11.
5For a good discussion about the history of P.L. 480 
laws, objectives, administration, and operations, see: U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, P.L. 480 
Concessional Sales: History, Procedures, Negotiating and
Imp1ementinq Agreements, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report 
No. 142, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, Dec.
1977).
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Title I (concessional sales); "Provides for the sale of 
U.S. agricultural commodities to friendly countries with pay­
ment in the currency of recipient country."^ This title has 
involved three types of credit arrangements: (1) sales for
foreign currencies, (2) long-term dollar credit sales, and 
(3) long-term credit sales for convertible foreign currencies. 
Title I commodities are exported entirely by private U.S. 
trade and a U.S. bank pays the commercial exporter in dollars 
the same market price for sale under this title as for a 
commercial sale. Then, the U.S. government reimburses the 
bank and the recipient country pays the United States on a 
long-term, low-interest basis. In general, the proceeds 
under Title I are deposited in the U.S. government account in 
a financial institution of the recipient government. The 
funds are to be used by U.S. authorities in the recipient 
countries for meeting their needs, for loans and grants to 
the recipient countries, and some of this "soft currency" is 
to be used by the U.S. in recipient countries to cover the 
costs of maintenance of U.S. embassies and military installa­
tions. Wheat has been the leading Title I commodity, providing 
nearly one-half of all exports under this title.^
^Willard W. Cochrane, The World Food Problem (New York: 
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, Inc., 1969), p. 125.
^Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, July 
1977, pp. 11-12.
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Title II (Donations and disaster relief); "Authorizes 
donations of surplus farm products held in stock by the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) for famine and emergency 
relief, school feeding, community development, and other
Oeconomic development purposes overseas." Title II commod? 
ities are distributed through three cooperating sponsors:
(1) recipient countries operating under a bilateral agreement 
with the United states, (2) nonprofit voluntary U.S. agencies 
such as CARE (Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere), 
and (3) international agencies, such as WFP. Nonfat dry milk 
and wheat flour have been the leading Title II commodities, 
followed by wheat, blended food products, and soybean oil.
Title III (Food for development and barter): Autho­
rizes two types of programs: (1) for domestic donations of
surplus food to eligible people in the United States, and 
the program is administered by appropriate organizations, and
(2) for distribution to needy people of foreign countries 
through American voluntary agencies and international organiza­
tions. "The use of such goods is also authorized for barter 
to obtain certain strategic materials, and for the procure-
gment of off-shore goods and services." Wheat and feed grains 
were the main barter products, followed by cotton and tobacco. 
Title IV (General provision): Provides for long-term
p
W.W. Cochrane, p. 125. 
*Ibid., p. 126.
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credit sales of goods in dollars at relatively modest inter­
est rates. "The purpose of this title is to assist less 
developed countries which have reached an appropriate stage 
in the evolution of their economies to become dollar customers 
of the United States, while at the same time conserving their 
financial resources for use in the development process. 
Shipments under this title began in the last quarter of 1961.
Most of the United States agricultural exports under 
government-financed programs have been under P.L. 480 with 
smaller amounts under Mutual Security/AID (agency for Inter­
national Development) programs. For example, during the 
period 1955-1976, U.S. agricultural exports under government- 
financed programs totaled $28.6 billion which 90 percent 
(about $25.1 billion) were under P.L. 480 and the remainder 
under Mutual Security/AID programs. Of total P.L. 480 ex­
ports during the period 1955-1976, sales for local currencies 
accounted for 49 percent, long-term dollar credit and con­
vertible local currency credit sales 22 percent, grants and 
donations 22 percent, and barter for strategic materials and 
government procurement 7 percent. Besides, about three- 
fourths of all P.L. 480 exports to LDCs were under Title I 
with most of the remainder in Title II, and since the end of 
1971, the only new P.L. 480 agreements have been the long-term
l°Ibid.
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credit sales (Title I) and grants and donations (Title 11).^^
Also, during the above period, about 60 percent of the U.S.
food aid went to Asia, Africa and Latin America each received
about 9 percent, and the remainder for the most part went to 
12Europe.
Although the United States has been the world's major 
donor of food aid, its share of developed donors' food aid^ 
disbursements has decreased, and its commercial sales of 
farm products to LDCs have been increased. For example, the 
U.S. food aid share was more than 90 percent during 1960- 
1968, but dropped to 59 percent in 1975. Its commercial 
sales to LDCs increased from less than $1 billion during the 
period 1956-1966 to nearly $7 billion in 1975.^^ The value 
of agricultural products exported under the P.L. 480 program 
fell to its lowest level ever in 1973 and 1974. One impor­
tant reason for this reduction was due to heavy commercial 
purchases of USSR and other developed and developing coun­
tries from the U.S. (especially in 1972) which caused a 
large reduction of the United States food reserves, particularly
Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, 
July 1977, pp. 10-11, and P.L. 480 Concessional Sales, 
December 1977, p. 8.
12Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, 
January 1977, p. 9.
^^Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States, 
July 1977, p. 10 and p. 14.
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g r a i n s . Of course, many countries (both developed and 
developing) that formally imported food under P.L. 480 
programs have progressed economically to the point where 
such imports are no longer necessary, and most of them - 
Japan, Taiwan, and Brazil - have graduated from being P.L. 
480 Title I recipients to being the major commercial markets 
for V.S. agricultural exports.
Survey of Theoretical and Analytical Studies of the 
Impact of Food Aid on Domestic Production and Prices
Since the inception of P.L. 480 shipments in 1954, 
much has been written on the issue of food aid in economic 
development. At the heart of the problem is the question of 
whether or not farmers, who are at or near the subsistence 
level, respond to price changes. A leading advocate of the 
hypothesis that peasant farmers do respond to prices is 
T. Schultz. He cites as evidence general studies by Hopper
Note that at the end of 1973, the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quadrupled its prices 
for petroleum, and with oil as their major imports, the 
balance of payments deficits of most of the OPEC members 
mounted. In 1975, in order to help the non-oil developing 
countries, a new act (P.L. 94-161, which amended P.L. 480) 
included new criteria for selecting P.L. 480 recipient coun­
tries. The P.L. 94-161 required that at least 75 percent of 
Title I sales go to countries with an annual per capita GNP 
of $300 or less, for more information on this point, see: 
P.L. 480 Concessional Sales, December 1977, pp. 4-5, and 
U.S. Congress, Senate, American Foreign Food Assistance: 
Public Law 480 and Related Materials, 94th Cong., 2d sess., 
1976, pp. 1-14.
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and Tax, and a supply response study of Punjabi cotton by
R. K r i s h n a . B a u e r  and Yamey also found a large degree of
response to price incentives in cocoa and palm oil production
in N i g e r i a . F a i s o n ,  who studied wheat, jute and cotton
production gave the same c o n c l u s i o n . O n  the other hand,
others such as Galbraith argued that peasant farmers do
not respond to price incentives due to the high risks in-
18volved in trying something new.
One of the first theories of the effect of food aid
on production was developed by T. Schultz. His argument
was that although food aid would reduce the price that farmers
receive, the effect on short-run production would be small,
and in the long-run, the effect would be a decreased public
and private investment in agriculture and hence a reduction
19of domestic supply.
T.W. Schultz, Transforming Traditional Agriculture,
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1964), and R. Krishna,
"Farm Supply Response in India-Pakistan: A Case Study of the
Punjab Region," Economic Journal 73 (September 1953): 477-
487.
^^P.T. Bauer, and B.S. Yamey, "A Case Study of Response 
to Price in an Underdeveloped Economy," Economic Journal 69 
(December 1959): 800-884.
^^W.P. Falcon, "Real Effects of Foreign Surplus Dispo­
sal in Underdeveloped Economies; Further Comment," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 77 (May 1963): 323-326.
18J.K. Galbraith, Economic Development in Perspective, 
(Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1962).
19T.W. Schultz, "Value of U.S. Farm Surpluses to Under­
developed Countries," Journal of Farm Economics 42 (December 
1960): 1019-30.
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Khatkhate's 1962 article reported an expectation of
little price response from subsistence famers. In other
words, when an economy is characterized by small-scale
subsistence farming, there is no response of output (total
production) to price and the response of supply (marketings)
may be opposite to the price movement because a minimum
20amount of cash is needed by each farmer.
In 1963, two studies by Falcon and Beringer refuted
Khatkhate's argument. Falcon recorded relative large price
elasticities of supply in Pakistan, and argued that P.L. 480
imports could cause significant changes in the composition
of agricultrual output in the receiving country. Also, he
concluded that the change might severely affect the ratio
21between food and cash crops. Beringer's study reached the 
same conclusions as Falcon namely that cash crops are more 
price elastic than food crops, and that reduced prices for 
food crops could lead to shifts in cash crops in Pakistan. 
Hence, a policy of striving to reach self-sufficiency in
food production, while at the same time importing P.L. 480
22grains, may be contradictory.
20D.R. Khatkhate, "Some Notes on the Real Effects of 
Foreign Surplus Disposal in Underdeveloped Economies," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 76 (February 1962): 186-196.
21W.P. Falcon, "Further Comment," Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 77 (May 1963); 323-26.
22C. Beringer, "Real Effects of Foreign Surplus Disposal 
in Underdeveloped Economies: A Comment," Quarterly Journal
of Economics 77 (May 1963): 317-23.
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A second major theoretical argument of the effects 
of food aid on domestic production was developed by F. Fisher 
in 1963. He demonstrated that T. Schultz's idea that the 
price effect could be measured by the inverse of price elas­
ticity of demand is correct only if it is assumed that the 
supply of domestic production has price elasticity equal to 
zero.
Fisher set up a theoretical method for measuring the
effect of imports of food (shipments) on domestic supply
(domestic output). This effect depends on (1) the price
elasticity of demand, (2) the price elasticity of domestic
supply, and (3) the ratio of total demand to domestic supply.
His model does not consider imports other than those under
P.L. 480 and the withdrawals from s t o c k s . A c c o r d i n g  to
his argument, the greater the elasticity of supply and the
less the elasticity of demand, the greater the fall in
domestic production brought about by a given increase in
25surplus imports. Lastly, he claimed that "surplus disposal
by free gift (or sale on special concessionary terms) may
2 6indeed have the effects of a form of dumping." This point
23P.M. Fisher, "A Theoretical Analysis of the Impact 
of Food Surplus Disposal on Agricultural Production in 
Recipient Countries," Journal of Farm Economics 45 (November 
1963): 863-75.
24J.S. Mann, "The Impact of Public Law 480 Imports on 
Prices and Domestic Supply of Cereals in India," American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 49 (February 1967): 132.
^^F.M. Fisher, pp. 867-69.
^^Ibid., p. 873.
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is discussed further in the study by Rogers, Srivastava, 
and Heady.
In 1967, J. Mann extended Fisher's argument by in­
cluding commercial imports, and stock changes in the supply 
equation. Mann incorporated this supply equation into a 
six equation model. These six equations (i.e., supply, 
demand, commercial imports, stock withdrawals, income genera­
tion, and market clearing identity) formed a simultaneous 
model which when shocked provided answers to the three 
following questions commonly related to P.L. 480 imports;
1. "What is the impact of a unit increase in P.L. 480
imports of a commodity during a given time period
on the domestic production and price of that com-
27modity during the same time period?"
2. "What is the impact of such change during each of
28the successive time periods?"
3. "What is the total impact, particularly on domestic
29production, over a period of time?"
Mann applied his model to India (1952-63) and found 
that the imports of cereals under P.L. 480 lowers the price 
of cereals and leads to a decline in supply of cereals from 
domestic production but the decrease in domestic supply is




less than the quantity imported. Thus, there is a net addi­
tion to the quantity available for consumption which is a 
significant contribution in shortage economy.
In Mann’s model, the price-output response to a change 
in P.L. 480 shipments is examined in terms of a unit shock 
which is not sustained. That is, P.L. 480 imports increased 
by one unit in a period and then returned to their original 
level. This procedure was criticized by Seevers.^^
In 1968, a fourth major extension of the theoretical
aspects of the effect of food aid on production was made by 
32G. Seevers. His model differs from Fisher's original model
in two respects. (1) Seever's model included variables for
commercial imports, population, real income, and government
investment in food grain production. (2) While Fisher's
model used the ratio of shipments to domestic output in
order to set up a model for measuring the price-output effects
of imports upon the agriculture of the recipient countries,
for the same purpose, Seever's model used the ratio of ship-
33ments to quantity demanded (total utilization). Also, in 
estimating the price-output effects, his approach is different
3°Ibid., p. 144.
^^G.L. Seevers, "An Evaluation of the Disincentive Effect 
Caused by P.L. 480 Shipments," American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 50 (August 1968): 630-42.
^^Ibid.
and VI.
33For more explanation about this point see: Chapters V
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from Mann's study. While Mann "estimates the parameters and
then investigates a 'one-shot' change in shipments.
Seevers relies on parameter estimates of other workers and
considered a permanent or sustained change in shipments.
Using Indian data for the periods 1956-57 and 1961-62, 
he reached the conclusion that for normal ranges of supply
and demand elasticities, changes in the level of food imports
induced only small percentage changes in price and still
smaller percentage changes in domestic output. But, a one
percent change in supply due to P.L. 480 shipments could,
with a high supply elasticity and a low demand elasticity,
cause changes in production more than the amount of the
shipment. For the usual range of both elasticities, however,
the decline in domestic production would be less than the
P.L. 480 shipments.
Lastly, Seevers pointed out that in evaluating P.L. 480
imports, it is necessary to take account of alternative uses
for the resources displayed by these imports, though in the case
of India, he pointed out that the net result was beneficial.
35In 1972, Rogers, Srivastava, and Heady tried to 
expand Mann's work by allowing for differential markets
^^Ibid., p. 634, Footnote 4.
^^K.D. Rogers, V.K. Srivastava, and E.O. Heady, 
"Modified Price, Production, and Income Impacts of Food 
Aid Under Market Differentiated Distribution," American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 54 (May, 1972): 201-208
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(one market for domestic production of wheat and a second 
market for P.L. 480 imports of wheat). They argued that:
Mann's model...contained only one demand 
equation. He implicitly assumed P.L. 480 
import demand to be homogeneous with demand 
for domestic commodities and that P.L. 480 
commodities enter the market in the same way 
as domestically produced commodities...how­
ever, P.L. 480 commodities enter the market 
in many countries through a concessional 
market...the distribution of food aid com­
modities through a concessional market pro­
vides for market differentiation and, in 
turn, expanded demand as a result of a 
real income effects of lower price in con­
cessional market as compared to open m a r k e t . . . 36
According to the above argument, the existence of
food at lower prices to some people, causes an increase in
their real income (in aggregate terms) and this implies a
shift to the right of aggregate demand curve. Hence, due to
this shift, Fisher's hypothesis that the negative effect of
food aid on prices and output is much less (or absent) under
a differentiated market situation could be true.
In order to test Fisher's theoretical hypothesis,
Rogers, Srivastava, and Heady covered essentially the same
ground as Mann, added an additional equation, and estimated
the effect of food aid on the distribution of food grains
through subsidized "fair-price shops" in India for the
3Gibid., p. 201.
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37period 1956-67. Their study showed that about 90 percent 
of the food aid was distributed in this manner. In addition, 
the subsidized prices induced a net increase in total food 
grain consumption, so that agricultural production declined 
by only three percent of the food aid provided or a tenth of 
the loss estimated by Mann. Therefore, Mann's study over­
stated the negative price-output effect by ignoring the posi­
tive income effect of food aid. Hence, if the shift in de­
mand as well as in supply is recognized, the impact of P.L.
480 shipments on domestic production of the recipient country
38is estimated to be a fraction of one percent.
In 1975, Dudley and Sandilands considered the side
3 9effects of P.L. 480 wheat imports in the case of Colombia.
They suggested that the effects on the recipient country 
depend on the policies of the government marketing agency 
which distributes the imports under P.L. 480. A key proposi­
tion was that the greater the price elasticity of domestic 
demand and supply, the more wheat (both surplus and commercial)
37In India, the grains imported under P.L. 480, along 
with those produced internally, are sold by the government to 
the consumers through a large number of licensed retail dealers- 
"the fair-price shops."
3Glbid., pp. 207-8.
39L. Dudley, and R. J. Sandilands, "The Side Effects 
of Foreign Aid: The Case of Public Law 480 Wheat in Columbia,"
Economic Development and Cultural Change 23 (January 1975): 
325-36.
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is likely to be produced. Note that this result is dif­
ferent from the conclusion of Fisher who argued that the 
higher the elasticity of supply and the lower the elasticity 
of demand, the larger the reduction in domestic output 
brought about by a given increase in surplus imports.
A theoretical model for the marketing of surplus 
wheat imports in cooporating the above proposition was 
developed and applied to Colombia for the period 1958-71.
The evidence supported their hypothesis that "if the market­
ing agency attempts to maximize total government revenues 
from the marketing of wheat, the result will generally be 
less than optimal from the stand point of s o c i e t y . D u r ­
ing the above period, the price received by domestic pro­
ducers was 20 percent lower than the estimated socially 
optimal level. As a result, wheat import amounted to 
1,400,000 tons which could have been produced in the coun­
try at a lower opportunity cost.
In 1977, an article by Isenman and Singer raised the 
question of food aid once more.^^ They reviewed some of the 
data and literature on the price and resultant production 
effects of food aid on food grain production in India. They 
argued that even the model by Rogers, Srivastava, and Heady
4°Ibid., p. 328.
^^P.J. Isenman, and H.W. Singer, "Food Aid: Discentive
Effects and Their Policy Implication,"Economic Development and 
Cultural Change Index to Volume 25 (October 1976-77): 205-37.
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(the most comprehensive multiequation model) ignored the 
dynamic effects of the food aid on growth in output, employ­
ment, and thus, on demand for food grains in subsequent 
periods. To evaluate the net effect of food aid on domestic 
food output:
we need to consider its effects on the price 
of food and on government policies. The 
price effect depends on several factors...
It is preferable to estimate these effects 
through a multiequation econometric model, 
since some of the independent variables 
affecting food production and demand also 
affect each other over time. However, this 
is far easier said than done. Problems 
include the time and expense involved for a 
series of country studies, the lack in many 
countries of reliable data for relevant vari­
ables, the danger of leaving out or misspecify- 
ing relevant variables or relationships..., 
and changes in agricultural technologies or in 
government policies (such as prices supports) 
which reduce the validity of conclusions drawn 
from analyses of past data. These problems do 
not necessarily disappear when a "commonsense" 
approach...is used instead...ideally, a combina­
tion of the econometric and commonsense approaches 
would be desirable...42
Hence, they used a combination of the econometric and
commonsense approaches and reached the following conclusions
which are quite different from generally accepted thinking on
the price-output effects of food aid on food grain production
in India during the period 1956-1971
while use of large-scale food aid should have 
been phased in more gradually by, in some years.
42ibid., pp. 209-10.
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stockpiling more and distributing less, the 
short-term price effect on food production 
was very limited; the medium-term income and 
price (taking account of the effect of food 
aid on growth) was probably positive; and 
the medium-term effect on overall output, 
employment, and nutrition (as distinct from 
foodgrain production only) was strongly posi­
tive... In sum, the expected detremental price 
effect of food aid on Indian agricultural 
production was offset by increased subsidized 
food distribution and a low price elasticity of 
supply, and in the slightly longer run, by incope- 
induced demand increases to which the food aid 
contributed.43
The studies reviewed warrant the conclusions that 
P.L. 480 probably has had some beneficial effects in most 
recipient countries. However the problem of assessing the 
advantages and disadvantages of the P.L. 480 program (i.e, 
direct and indirect) is difficult, complex and depends on the 
perspective taken— that of donor or recipient country.
43lbid., p. 212 and p. 237.
CHAPTER III
PHYSICAL FACTORS INFLUENCING AGRICULTURAL 
' PRODUCTION IN IRAN
Iran is situated in southwest Asia between 25 and 
40 degrees north latitude, and has an area of about 1,648,000 
square kilometers, which is slightly larger than Alaska. The 
country is a mountainous land with high plateau regions. It 
has coastlines on the Caspian Sea, Persian Gulf and Gulf of 
Oman. For neighbors, it has the Soviet Union, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Iraq and Turkey (Figure 1).
The distribution of agricultural activity in Iran re­
flects the availability of certain natural resources which 
the most important of these are the presence of a long enough 
growing season for a particular crop, good soil, flat land 
and water. In this chapter, a brief discussion of soils, 
climate, water resources, topography, and cultural practices 
is given.
Soil Conditions and Land Utilization
Soil is one of the most vital natural resources of 
any country, because without it agricultural activity is not 
possible. Although roughly half of Iran is made up of the
31
















Source: Area Handbook for Iran, (Washington,
University, 1978), p. 14.
D.C.: American
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arid central plateau, some of the gentler slopes and the 
Persian Gulf lowlands have relatively good soils but poor 
drainage (Figure 1) .
The Iranian Ministry of Agriculture and Food with 
the help of Agricultural Organization of the United Nations 
(FAG) has prepared a detailed soil map of Iran at a scale of 
1:2,500,000. Nineteen soil associations were identified and 
used as a basis of mapping. For convenience, these mapping 
units were grouped into four (soils of the plains and valleys, 
soils of the Plateau, soils of the Caspian Piedmont, and 
soils of the dissected slopes and mountains) physiographic 
units. But to make the soil map more useful for planning pur­
poses, different classes of soils have been classified into 
five groups —  with ten divisions in all —  in order to 
indicate the limitations of the soils for agricultural pro­
ductivity. The five groups are ranging from soils with no or 
only slight limitations, to those with almost no potential^ 
(Figure 2).
In general, the majority of the soils in the country 
are grey and reddish desert-steppe soils, with many areas of 
saline soils associated with the swamps and basins of interior 
drainage. Shallow mountain meadow soils occur on the
Peter Beaumont, Gerald H. Blake, and J. Malcolm 
Wagstaff, The Middle East: A Geographical Study, (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, 1976), pp. 39-40.
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FIGURE 2. IRAN: SOIL POTENTIALITY MAP
Source: Dewan and Famouri, The Soil of Iran,
(Rome; FAO, 1964).
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2high mountains of the Elburz and Zagros, while on the west —  
facing steppes of the Zagros, chesnut soils may be found.
Lower Khazustan has recent alluvium on the Kuran plain, and 
on the Caspian littoral and northern Elburz slopes, brown
3earths may be found.
Out of the total area of 165 million hectares of Iran, 
about 11.5 percent or 19 million hectares are cultivated.
Only one-third of this is actually planted in any year, the 
remainder lying fallow. Other land use is forest and scrub­
land, 19 million hectares; pasture and range, 41 million 
hectares; cities, towns roads, and wasteland, 86 million 
hectares.^ This division of land usage has remained much 
the same throughout the twentieth century, with the exception 
that the area of land under cultivation has increased (Table 1 
and Figure 3).
2The Elburz Mountains run generally from west to 
east from the Ararat massif in the northland to the valley 
of the Hari-Rud, beyond Mashhad in the northeast. The 
western and sountern highland ramparts of Iran are the 
Zagros ranges, running from the high plateaus of the north­
west, first in a southerly direction and then southeasterly 
through Kurdistan and the provinces of Khuzistan and Pars 
(Figure 1).
^M. Beheschti, World Atlas of Agricutlure, Vol. 2, 
(Italy: I.G.D.A., Novara, Afficine Grafiche, 1973), pp. 254-
55.
^Echo of Iran, Iran Almanac and Book of Facts, (Tehran, 
Iran: The Echo of Iran, 1971), p. 364.
TAULE 1
[31STRIUUTION OF I.AND UV USE AT END OF THIRD AND FOURTH PLANS, IRAN, 1967 AND 1972
1967
Hectares % of Totall 
________________________________________(00Ü)______________
Total Cultivated land, including
fallow:....................  19,000 11.5
Area under annual and permanent
cultivation:............ 7,100 4.3
irrigated:................... 3,150 44
Area prepared for cultivation
beneath dams: ............... ..... ....
Dry farmed:................. 3,950 56
Area temporarily fallow: . . . .  11,900 7.2
2Permanent pastures and meadows . . 10,000 6.1
Forests and woods^ ............... 19,000 11.5
Uncultivated land capable of recla­
mation and development*...  31,000 28.8
Uncultivatable land including moun­
tains, deserts, lakes, cities,





.includes only relatively good pasture land 
Includes depleted pasture lands
1972
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FIGURE 3. IRAN; LAND UTILIZATION
Source: Are% Handbook for Iran, (Washington, D.C.;
American University, 1978), p. 332.
38
In 1960/ for the purposes of the most comprehensive 
agricultural survey of the country by the government, four 
regions were distinguished as follows (Figures 4 and 5):
Zone 1: Caspian Littoral - north Gilan, and north
Mazanderan.
Zone 2: Northwest and West - Azerbaijan, Kermanshah,
north Khuzistan, and northwest Fars.
Zone 3: South - southern Khuzistan, Fars, Kerman,
and south Baluchistan.
Zone 4: Central, east and northeast - south Gilan,
south Mazanderan, Isfahan, north Kerman, 
Kharasan, and north Baluchistan.
There are great differences in the land uses in the 
above four zones. The largest regional ratio of land in 
agricultural holdings under cultivation is in the west and 
northwest zone which is generally well watered and has 
stretches of fertile land on the high plateaus. However, 
the Caspian zone has the highest ratios of cultivated land 
in arable use for annual crops, and the lowest ratios of 
fallow land. Both Zones 1 and 3 include high ratios of 
permanent grassland in hilly and mountainous districts.^
In terms of area planted, cereals are the most im­
portant category and wheat is the most important crop. More 
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FIGURE 4. IRAN: AGRICULTURAL ZONES
Source; M. Becheschti, World Atlas of Agriculture  ̂
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Source: Area Handbook for Iran, (Washington, D.C.:




to growing wheat, barley, rice and other grains. Wheat 
production occupies 56 percent of the cultivated area, as 
against 17 percent for barley. Wheat is an essential food 
staple for most of the population. Wheat and barley are 
planted on dry-farmed and irrigated lands and on mountain 
slopes and plains. Wheat is used almost exclusively for 
human consumption, but barley is used mainly as animal feed.
Rice is the only other significant cereal, and it is the 
only crop grown exclusively under irrigation. Rice production 
occupies 5 percent of the cultivated area, and it grows pri­
marily on the wet Caspian lowlands in Gilan and Mazandaran 
provinces where heavy rainfall facilitates paddy cultivation. 
From the remaining land under cultivation (22 percent) in any 
year, about 5 percent is planted in cotton, 10 percent in 
other field crops, and 7 percent in fruits and nuts^ (Figure 6).
Climate and Precipitation 
Another major factor in agricultural production, 
expecially for food grains, is weather. In general, climate 
of Iran and the southwestern part of the United States is 
similar, except that Iran is generally more arid. Iran's 
climate is characterized by hot summers (except in the north­
west along the Elburz Mountains and the Caspian Sea), generally 
cold winter, and frequent high winds.
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Throughout the year, the prevailing wind direction 
is northerly or northwesterly but local topography produces, 
at different times of year, various local wind conditions.
For example, in the Sistan basin of southwest of the country 
an extremely hot and dusty wind (known as 120-day wind) blows 
from the north and northwest throughout much of the summer.
In July and August, the mean monthly temperature in 
the north can rise to 26°C (79°F) along the Caspian Sea, and 
it is between 25°C (77°F) and 28°C (82°F) on the northern 
part of the plateau. The southern coastal region is very hot 
from May to September. In Abadan, on the Persian Gulf, temp­
eratures as high as 51°C (123°F) have been recorded, but the 
mean temperature there for the months of July and August is 
under 38°C (100°F).^ In general, temperatures decrease from 
southeast to northwest though, at higher altitudes in the 
Zagros Mountains and northwest plateau, temperatures are 
naturally lower than the latitudinal norm (see Table 9 in 
the Appendix).
Precipitation occurs when moist air is lifted above 
its condensation level and water droplets are formed. Winter 
and early spring is the rainy season of Iran. Generally speak­
ing, the annual amount of precipitation decreases from north 
to south and from west to east, except where local relief
7U.S., Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service, Iran: Agricultural Production and Trade, by M.E.
Kurtig (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April
1974), p. 5.
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modifies these trends. A very large proportion of the coun­
try recieves only moderate amount of rain —  40 millimeters 
(mm) or less. Roughly, the southern two-thirds of the coun­
try recieves over 50 percent of its precipitation in winter 
(January to March), and the southeastern corner receives 
over 75 percent in that season. Towards the interior, 
spring rainfall is important, but thereafter, almost every­
where, apart from the Caspian littoral, has virtual summer 
drought. Along the Caspian Sea lowlands of Iran, high pre­
cipitation values, commonly over 1000 mm per annum in the
Owestern area, are recorded (Table 9).
In Iran, a substantial amount of snow falls in the 
cold winter months (particularly during the period from 
October to March) on the high mountains and plateaus. Ow­
ing to the altitude, the snow does not melt immediately, 
but rather remains as deep snowpacks. This factor is of 
great importance in the country's farming economy, since 
the moisture so stored becomes available in spring and early 
summer as snow melts. Maximum water discharges are during 
April and May, at a time which coincides with the beginning 
of the growing season (Table 2). But once the early summer 
discharge peak has passed, the availability of water from 
surface source reduces reapidly. Unfortunately, this is a
g In general, average annual rainfall is approximately 
9 inches (228.6 mm), and it varies from heavy rainfall near 
the Caspian Sea to none in the central plateau and desert 
areas. Ibid., p. 30.
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time when water demand for the growing crops is reaching a 
maximum. Where water cannot be supplied from alternative 
sources during this period, arable farming is not possible.
Generally speaking, Iran is a country of scant rain­
fall. It is estimated that the annual amount of precipita­
tion for the country as a whole averages from 300 to 350 mm 
of rain and snow. The absolute amount of precipitation 
ranges from less than 10 mm in the desert interior, to more 
than 2,000 mm in the southwestern corners of the Caspian 
(Rasht and Gilan). The amount of rainfall is sufficient to 
adequately water only about 10 percent of the country. In 
addition to being scanty, since rainfall varies from year 
to year, agriculture is precarious and its economic pros­
perity depends almost directly on the actual annual pre-
9cipitation.
Water Resources and Irrigation 
A reliable supply of water for both irrigation and 
agricultural use is one of the prerequisites for human sur­
vival. Generally, the total water supply within a country 
is studied by means of water map of annual precipitation.
Scarcity of water has been a major problem facing 
Iranian agriculture and has lead to a great deal of investment 
in irrigation methods. It is estimated^® that successful
9 Echo of Iran, p. 92.
^^Beaumont, Blake, and Wagstaff, p. 448.
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TABLE 2
PLANTING AND HARVESTING CALENDAR FOR 
SELECTED GRAINS IN IRAN
Grains Planting Season Harvesting Season
Barley October - May April - August
Corn April - May July - September
Grain Sorghum April-Mid-June July - September
Rice April - June August - October
Wheat October - April May - September
Source: U.S., Department of Agriculture, Economic Research
Service, Iran: Agricultural Production and Trade,
by M.E. Kurtig (Washington, D.C.: Government Print­
ing Office, April 1974), p. 14.
47
agriculture without irrigation in the country, requires at 
least 240 mm annual precipitation and an interannual vari­
ability of 37 percent. Unfortunately, about half the total 
area of Iran recieves annual totals of less than this amount 
(Figure 7). While the highland areas of the country receive 
greatest total annual precipitation, farming in these regions 
is made difficult due to shallow soils, scarcity of flat land, 
and a restricted growing season (Figure 8). Hence, "a com­
promise has to be made in which water is transported from the 
uplands of water surplus to the dry bringing basins and alluvial 
plains, which possess a longer growing season and more fertile 
s o i l s . S u c h  water movement is accomplished by river flow.
For example, Karun river and other rivers passing through 
Khuzestan carry water during periods of maximum flow that are
ten times the amount born in dry periods (Figure 5).
But despite the fair number of permanent rivers in 
Iran, their locations and seasonal variations in water flow
have caused the peasant farmers to seek other water supplies
12for irrigation. One common method throughout much of the
country is the "qanat" system:
l^Ibid.
12The process of controlled application of water to 
soil, in order to make good any soil moisture deficiencies 
which limit the optimum growth of crops, is called irriga­
tion. The three basic irrigation methods are surface, sub­
surface, and sprinkler irrigation method. For more informa­
tion see: P.B. Beaumont, G.H. Blake, and J.M. Wagstaff, The
Middle East: A Geographical Study, (New York: John Wiley and
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FIGURE 7. ANNUAL PRECIPITATION TOTALS IN IRAN
Source; After Climatic Atlas of Iran, (Iran: Tehran,
Plan Organization, 1965).
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FIGURE 8. LENGTH OF GROWING SEASON IN IRAN.
Source: After Climatic Atlas of Iran, (Iran: Tehran,
Plan Organization, 1965).
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"Qanat" system is a system of underground tunnels 
dating back over 2000 years. This system consists of a 
gently sloping tunnel which conducts water from an infiltra­
tion section beneath the watertable to the ground surface by 
gravity flow. Therefore, water supply through this system, 
apart from annual cleaning and maintenance, demands neither 
human nor animal nor mechanical power (Figure 9). Hence, the 
great advantage of the system is that once constructed, it 
will continue to supply water for long periods with little 
energy input. But, its largest drawback is that the water 
discharge cannot be controlled according to the requirements. 
This means that water runs to waste during the winter season 
when irrigation is not required. Even during the summer 
months, water supply from the system (most of the time) during 
the night is unused, unless a strong reservoir is constructed 
downslope from the point where the tunnel reaches the ground 
s u r f a c e . T h e  discharge of water from "qanats" exhibits 
seasonal variations, as well as longer period trends dependent 
upon climatic fluctuations so that discussion of average 
value is somewhat difficult. Nevertheless, it is estimated^^ 
that the majority of discharge value of water from Iranian 
"qanats" fall between 0 and SOm^/hr (cubic meter per hour) 
although occasionally, values of over 300m^/hr have been re­
corded. The number of "qanata" in Iran is estimated^^ between
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FIGURE 9. A QANAT: CROSS-SECTION AND PLAN
Source: P. Beaumont, G.H. Blake, and J.M. Wagstaff,
The Middle East: A Geographical Study, (New
York: John Wiley and Son, 1976), p. 89.
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20,000 and 40,000, with total length exceeding 100,000 miles 
(160,000 kilometers). But, not all of 40,000 "qanats" are 
in operation at any one time because of cleaning, clogging 
(resulting from flash floods), and damages caused by earth­
quakes .
A second traditional irrigation method common in 
hillside farming involves digging channels from rivers 
and streams in order to carry water directly into the 
cultivated fields. The water is usually diverted into 
these channels by temporary wooden or gravel structures.
This method is usually complex and requires careful control.
A third method involves the use of water drawn from 
wells. By the end of World War II, a limited number of wells 
were in existence, but the tempo of well drilling increased 
essentially during 1960's. It is estimated^^ that by 1970, 
about 7400 deep wells were producing groundwater for irriga­
tion in various parts of Iran.
In Iran, the most extensive type of water resource 
development during the years since World War II has been 
the construction of large reservoir dams with the objective 
of serving a number of p u r p o s e s . B e t w e e n  1957 and 1976, 
thirteen of these dams were completed. For example, the first
^^Area Handbook for Iran (Washington, D.C.: American
University, 1978), p. 334.
^^These purposes have usually included the provision 
of irrigation water, domestic and industrial water supply, 
hydro-electric power generation, and flood control.
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of the major dams (Dez in Khuzistan Province) was com­
pleted in 1962. The project, modeled after the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, was designed to transform the arid land 
of the Khuzestan plain and to satisfy a large part of the 
country's electricity demands. Unfortunately, after the 
first years of operations, the dam has achieved only a small 
proportion of its original goals, and the result was that
in 1969, a law was passed for nationalization of irrigable
18lands downstream from all dams. Thus, in Iran, only rarely 
"have the dams been part of an integrated scheme with the 
aim of the unified development of a river basin system, such 
as was achieved in the United States of America with the 
establishment of the Tennessee Valley Authority... all too 
often in the past, a dam has been constructed with the sole 
aim of providing benefits to a particular area without any 
consideration of the likely impacts on the rest of the 
basin.
Generally speaking, the Iranian government, through a
18The lands below Dez dam were later leased to newly 
established domestic and foreign companies that became known 
as agribusinesses, for more information on this point, see: 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of International Commerce, 
Iran: A Survey of U.S. Business Opportunities, (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 1977), pp. 16-41.
19Beaumont, Blake, and Wagstaff, p. 92.
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20programme of economic planning (launched in 1949, 1956,
1962, 1968, and 1973) which was financed largely by oil
revenues, and land reform (January 9, 1962) tried to change,
especially the traditional agricultural system of the country
and particularly the irrigation methods (see next chapter).
Besides, since the end of World War II, Iranian private
enterprise has achieved a measure of success through the use
%
of diesel or electric pumps on the river banks for the irriga­
tion of orchards and small farms, and of a few large modern
21farms also. It is estimated that the number of pumps rose 
from 831 in 1961 to about 2,933 in 1971.
20The Iran Plan Organization was established in 1946, 
and since 1973, known as the Plan and Budget Organization.
The Organization's power and responsibilities have varied.
It was originally responsible for preparing the Master Plan 
for five year development plans, supervising the implementa­
tion of smaller plans, and financing the plans. "Except for 
broad, multiministry projects, the ministries proposed and 
executed approved development projects in their sector, free­
ing the organization from the large executive burden it had 
carried in the early years. It no longer disburses actual 
funds or manages foreign loans, both functions having been 
regained by the Ministry of Economy and Finance," see:
Area Handbook for Iran (Washington, B.C.: American University,
1978), p. 274.
21F.R.C. Bagley, "A Bright Future After Oil: Dams
and Agroindustry in Khuzistan," The Middle East Journal 
30 (Winter 1976): 27.
CHAPTER IV 
THE ROLE OF WHEAT IN THE IRANIAN ECONOMY
The Economy and the Agricultural Sector of Iran
Modern Iranian economic history has been divided into 
four different phases. A preindustrialization phase extended 
from the end of World War II to 1962, during which the economy 
specialized in oil and agriculture production. The second 
phase, from 1962 to 1968, forms a transitional period, during 
which a land reform program was initiated. The third phase, 
1968-72, was a period of almost rapid economic growth. The 
final phase since 1973 comprises the oil boom years.^
In this chapter, the economic condition of the country 
during the different phases will be reviewed with a special 
emphasis on the second and the third phase (9162-72). The 
discussion also will cover wheat production, consumption, 
trade, and agricultural policies of the Iranian government.
The Economy
Of the total of nearly 16 million population of Iran
^Robert E. Looney, Iran at the End of the Century, 
(Lexington: D.C. Heath and Co., 1977), p. 5.
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at the end of World War II/ about three quarters lived in 
rural and one quarter in urban areas. At that time, the 
country's gross national product (GNP), estimated by the 
United Nations in 1950/ was US $1.47 billion and a per capita 
income of approximately US $90. At that same time/ agricul­
ture accounted for 50 percent of the GNP and major crops
2production consisting of wheat/ barley/ rice/ and cotton.
The government's contribution in the economy has been 
rapidly increasing since the end of World War II. Formal 
development planning began with formation of the Plan Organiza­
tion in 1947 (renamed Plan and Budget Organization since 1973) . 
Five development plans/ differing widely in extent and scope/ 
have been launched since 1949.
The first seven-year plan (1949 - 55) suffered from 
the economic consequences of the nationalization of oil in 
March 1951/ which its revenue was the main source of funds 
for the plan. Originally/ 21 billion rials (Rls.) were al­
located for development financing for the plan period —  25 
percent to agriculture, 14 percent to industry and mining, 
and the rest to infrastructure and social development. But 
the actual total expenditure on the plan amounted to only 
Rls 6 billion and it was spent on such projects as the
2A Zahedani, "Iran: Evaluation of Agricultural
Development Strategy 1962 - 1972," (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of California, Davis, 1974), p. 7.
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construction of railroads, large warehouses, small dams, and 
the expansion of the sugar industry.^
During the first plan, agricultural production in­
creased at an annual average rate of between 2.5 and 3.0, 
which was almost sufficient to meet domestic needs. GNP was 
about Rls 155 billion, and total population increased to 
about 20 million.^ The physical achievements of the first 
plan were confined to the establishment of six new industrial 
factories, some road and rail construction, and a few minor 
developments in irrigation and mechanization in the agricul­
tural sector. According to J. Bharier, "what had started out 
as a 'big push' to attain economic self-sufficiency thus 
ended as a feeble puff."^
In the second seven-year plan (1955-62) greater atten­
tion was given to evaluation of the available domestic and 
foreign financial resources. The plan called for a total 
outlay of Rls 70 billion over the plan period. This sum was 
to be allocated for four major projects— transportation and 
communication 33 percent, agriculture and irrigation 26 per­
cent, public utilities and social services 26 percent, and 
industry and mining 15 percent.^ Although at a later date
^Area Handbook for Iran (Washington, D.C.: American
University, 1978), p. 257.
^A. Zahedani, p. 8.
^Julian Bharier, Economic Development in Iran (1900- 
1970), (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 90.
^Second Development Plan Final Report, (Tehran: Plan
Organization, 1964), Table 2, p. 70 (in Farsi).
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total authorized expenditures were increased by 20 percent—  
from Rls 70 billion to 84 billion in 1958— sectoral alloca-
7tions remained largely unchanged.
The second plan was to be financed by oil revenues 
accruing to the Iranian government under the 1954 Oil Agree­
ment, and through foreign borrowing repayable out of future 
oil revenues. Initially about 80 percent of the oil revenues 
was devoted to development finance for the second plan period, 
and was the main source of funds. However, the increasing 
current public expenditures and the reduction of foreign 
financial assistance forced the government to reduce the 
share of the Plan Organization to about Rls 55 percent of 
the total. The amount of oil revenues actually allocated to 
the Plan Organization during the plan came to about Rls 61 
billion, and foreign borrowing to approximately Rls 26 billion. 
By 1962, the GNP was about Rls 340.4 billion, and with popu­
lation at about 23 million, the per capita income was put at 
about Rls 14,780. The contribution of agriculture to GNP 
decreased steadily from about 50 percent at the end of World 
War II to about 28 percent in 1962, and for the first time
Qin 1960 noticeable quantities of grains were imported.
Serious difficulties arose during the execution of
7Area Handbook for Iran 1978, p. 275.
PJahangir Amuzegar, and M. Ali Fekrat, Iran Economic 
Development Under Dualistic Conditions, (Chicago: The Univer­
sity of Chicago, 1971), pp. 42-3, and Central Bank of Iran, 
National Income of Iran 1959-72, (Iran: Bank Markazi Iran,
Table 12, p. 21, and Table 54, p. 57.
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the second plan. For example, part of the plan called for 
two multi-purpose dams and extensive transportation construc­
tion, but because of their huge costs, they contributed to 
inflationary pressures. Hence, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) prepared a stabilization program that the Iranian 
government carried out.
Generally speaking, the two seven-year plans could 
hardly be called plans in the technical sense of the term. 
Strictly speaking they were more in the nature of financial 
allocations. They did not contain physical targets or ex­
plicit statements regarding the philosophy and strategy under­
lying the expenditures. The first attempt at comprehensive 
planning came with the third plan, and the approach gained 
greater sophistication with the fourth.
During the third development plan (1962-68) of five 
and one-half years, total actual investment amounted to Rls 
451 billion, of which the public sector accounted for Rls 
205 billion. The major sector allocations under the plan were 
transportation and communications, 25 percent; agriculture 
and irrigation, 21 percent; industry, 12 percent; and health
9and education, 15 percent.
The basic objective of the third plan was to raise real 
GNP by an average of 6 percent a year. But, real GNP (at 1965-66
93rd Development Plan Final Report, (Tehran: Plan
Organization, 1970), Table 10, p. 13.
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market prices) increased from Rls 350 billion in 1962-63 to 
Rls 534.6 billion in 1967-68, an average annual increase of 
8.8 percent. Real per capita GNP increased at an average 
rate of 6.5 percent a year - from US $179 in 1962-63 to 
US $260 in 1967-68.^^ During the plan period, population 
increased from about 23.4 million in 1962-63 to about 26.6 
million in 1967-68. In terms of distribution of employment, 
the agricultural sector accounted for about 46 percent of all 
employment in 1966-67 as compared to 56 percent in 1956-57.^^ 
The main objective of the third plan with regard to 
agriculture was an increase in agricultural production of 
about 4 percent a year, or 22 percent over the five-year 
period. Priority was given to development of the irriga­
tion system. Out of the total of about Rls 48 billion 
allocation of credit to agricultural sector, about Rls 22 
billion were devoted to irrigation methods. Unfortunately, 
the annual growth of agricultural production was 2.5 percent 
(in constant prices) which was much below the target growth.
The main reasons for this failure were the severe drought in 
three of the five years of the plan period, the reduction of 
private investment in this sector due to the implementation 
of land reform, and the preoccupation of the manpower and 
facilities of the Ministry of Agriculture (including technical.
l°Ibid., p. 2.
^^Ibid., p. 3, and p. 6.
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1 0administrative, and financial) with land reform (for
land reform, see next section of this chapter).
The fourth development plan (1968-72) was designed
by the government to emphasize Iran's industrial development.
The plan called for the investment of Rls 810 billion, of
which the government expenditures accounted for Rls 480
billion (about 60 percent of the total). The two main
sources of financing the plan were oil revenues (63 percent)
and foreign loans (24.6 percent). It was hoped that by
fiscal year 1972/73 the country's GNP would be about Rls
815 billion, and national income about Rls 720 billion,
yielding a per capita income of Rls 2-3,000 (about US $307).
Thus, the plan called for an economic growth of 57 percent
over the plan period, representing an average growth of 9
percent a year.^^
The growth rate of the industrial sector has been
set at an average growth rate of 15 percent a year. In this
sector, the value of industrial production was to be raised 
14100 percent.
In the agricultural sector, the average annual growth 
rate was set at 5 percent, yielding a total of about 28 percent 
over the plan period. In order to achieve this increase, the land
^^Ibid., p. 13, and pp. 21-22.
^^Iran's 4th Development Plan 1968-72, (Tehran: Plan
Organization, 1968), p. 37, (in Farsi).
l^ibid., p. 40.
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under cultivation was to be fully exploited, the establish­
ment of large agricultural units was to be encouraged, and 
the government was to promote the formation of large agro­
industrial c o m p l e x e s . A c c o r d i n g  to the plan, 61 percent 
of the total population was living in the rural areas, and 
the ratio of employed population in agriculture to total 
employment was 48 percent. The plan stated that no major 
changes were expected in this ratio over the five-year span 
of the plan.^®
During the plan period, increasing oil revenues enabled 
the revision of planned government development expenditures 
upward —  from Rls 480 billion to Rls 524 billion. But 
actual government development expenditures reached about 97 
percent of the revised target —  Rls 507 billion. Total 
investment was Rls 918 billion, and the agricultural sector 
experienced an annual growth rate of about 4 percent —  below 
the target growth rate. GNP increased by an average annual 
of 11.9 percent —  above the target growth rate. Actual 
expenditures on industry and mining (Rls 113 billion) were 
followed by transportation and communication (Rls 110 billion), 
oil and gas (Rls 57 billion), and agriculture (Rls 41 billion). 
Other important sectors were electricity, water, housing, 
education, and health.
l^Ibid., p. 39. 
l^Ibid., p. 81.
^^Area Handbook of Iran 1978, pp. 276-77.
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The Economy During the Third and Fourth National 
Development Plans (1962 - 1972)
For a decade, from March 20, 1962 to March 20, 1973,
Iran maintained in different ways, the greatest record of
18economic growth. During 1959 - 1962, the average annual 
growth rate of GNP and GDP in real terms were about 4 and
5 percent, respectively, while for the period of 1962 - 1972
this growth rate— for both GNP and GDP— was about 10 percent. 
During 1962 - 1972, with population growth rate of about 2.8 
percent a year, real per capita income was growing at about 
7 percent, and the growth rate for period 1959 - 1962 (at 
about the same population growth rate) was 1.6 percent 
(Table 3).
The growth of the industrial and mining sectors was 
outstanding throughout the period of 1959 to 1972. The per­
centage contribution to GDP (in constant prices) increased 
from about 17 percent in 1962 to about 20 percent in 1972, 
and during 1962 - 1972, the annual average percent rate of 
growth in real terms was about 12 percent (Table 3).
19The percentage contribution of the service sector 
to GDP (in constant prices) increased from about 36 percent in 1962 
to about 38 percent in 1972, and the annual average percent 
rate of growth from 1962 to 1972 in real terms was about
18In general, official data on major microeconomic and 
macroeconomic aggregates of Iran were not compiled until 1959.
^^See Footnote 5 in Table 3.
TABLR 3
GROWTH OF ECONOMIC SECTORS DURING THE THIRD AND FOURTH 
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLANS, IRAN, 1962 - 1972
Annual Average Percentage Rate 
of Growth*
Sector 1959 1962 1972 1959-62 1962-72 1959-72
Population (Millions) 
Output (Billion Rials)
21.2 23.0 30.5 2.71 2.82 2.79
GNP 283.9 324.2 889.0 4.42 10.08 8.78
Per Capita GNP^ 13,392 14,091 29,148 1.69 7.26 5.98
Agriculture 85.4 88.8 134.4 1.30 4.14 3.48
Oil^ 47.1 67. 3 271.0 11.89 13.92 13.46
Industry & Mining* 45.3 57.8 194.2 8.12 12.11 11.19
Services^ 107.7 119.8 363.9 3.54 11.11 9.36
GDP 285.5 333.7 963.5 5.20 10.60 9.36
1At 1959 prices.
^Rials.
^Value added in domestic oil.
^Non-residential construction, water and power are included in industry and mining sector.
^Services include: a) Transportation and Communication, b) Banking, Insurance and 
Brokerage, c) Domestic Trade, d) Housing Rent, e) Public Services, and f) Private Services.
‘Estimated by using V = Ae^^ where; V = end value, A = initial value, e = 2.71828, r = rate 
of growth and t = time.
Source: Central Bank of Iran, National Income of Iran 1959 - 1 972, (Iran: Bank Markazi
Iran, 1974), Table 16, p.25, and Table 54, p. 57.
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11 percent (Table 3). Usually "the service sector lags behind 
the industrial sector, if the strategy cf economic develop­
ment is aimed at promoting balanced growth. This is because 
the service sector operates on a derived demand basis with
backward linkages from the strictly output-oriented agricul-
20tural and industrial sectors.
The oil sector had an annual average growth rate of 
about 14 percent for 1962 - 1972 (in constant prices), and 
as a percentage share of GDP, it was 20 percent in 1962, and 
28 percent in 1972 (Table 3).
During 1962 - 1972, the performance of the agricul­
tural sector was essentially less than that of the other 
sectors. For this period, the annual average growth rate 
in real terms was about 4 percent. Its contribution to GDP 
decreased from 29.9 percent in 1959 to 26.6 percent in 1962 
and finally to about 14 percent in 1972 (Table 3).
Hence, as it is estimated in Table 3, from 1959 - 1972, 
the growth of oil revenues (13 percent) had the central role 
of change, but role of industry (11 percent) has been be­
coming important in the country.
Generally speaking, the universal concern about in­
dustrializing accounted for neglecting agriculture and a 
reduction of investment in this sector after World War II.
20R.E. Looney, pp. 23-4.
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In Iran, agriculture remained one of the least developed 
sectors of the economy despite its importance in terms of 
employment or contribution to GNP (see next section of this 
chapter.)
The Agricultural Sector 
As it is indicated elsewhere in this chapter, since 
the end of World War II important changes in the traditional 
agricultural system of Iran have occurred. The most impor­
tant measure, in social and political terms, taken by the 
government to alter this sector of the economy, was the Land 
Reform Law of 1962. According to A.K.S. Lambton, the land 
reform program "was intended first to break the political
and social influence of the landowning class, and secondly...
21to bring about the emergence of an independent peasantry."
Generally speaking, by the early 1970's —  when the actual
process of land distribution was completed —  most observers
agreed that the power of the large landowners as a class,
had been greatly decreased, but there was, and still is,
sharp disagreement as to whether an independent peasantry 
22had emerged.
21Ann K.S. Lambton, The Persian Land Reform 1962 - 
1966, (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1969), p. 64.
22For more information about these points, see:
James A. Bill, "Modernization and Reform From Above: The
Case of Iran," Journal of Politics (Feb. 1970), R. Ramazani, 
"Iran's White Revolution," International Journal of Middle 
East Studies (April 1974), and R. Ramazani, "Iran and the 
United States: An Experiment in Enduring Friendship," Middle
East Journal (Summer 1976).
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Hence, in order to find out whether or not the change 
in the pattern of land-ownership had affected crop production 
or general welfare of the farmers, first it seems necessary 
to give a short background about the traditional practices 
in agricultural sector of the Iranian economy.
Until the land reform program of January 1962, five 
different types of land - ownership were existing in the 
country ;
1. Large estates (or omdh malaki) owned by persons 
who leased or rented plots of land,
2. Peasant-owned properties (or khordah malaki), 
where small plots owned and operated by farmers,
3. Wagf land properties, in which rents or profits - 
mostly for religious purposes - were assigned for 
charitable uses of private or public character,
4. Public domain lands (or khalisat-i dulati), which 
is owned by government, and
5. Crown lands (or amlak-i saltanati), which were 
the personal estate of the Shah.
It is estimated^^ that before 1962 about 70 percent of fertile 
land was owned or controlled by a small number of large land­
lords who were members of ruling classes —  the royal family, 
high officials, tribal, religious leaders, and big merchants. 
But despite the dominance of large estates, large-scale farming 
was not generally practiced.
Traditionally, there were three common methods of
Bharier, p. 136.
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operating farmlands. They included; a share cropping system 
which was under the supervision of the landlord himself or 
the village headman (or katkhoda); a lease system, in which 
landlord rented his land to another person for a fixed rent, 
and finally, a peasant owners system according to which the 
peasants farmed their own small plots with the help of their 
families. Also, methods of cultivation were primitive, and 
higher yields were obtained only through better weather 
conditions.
Generally speaking, the crops were divided at harvest­
time between landlord and peasant according to five traditional
24factors of production —  land, labor, non-human power, water, 
and seed —  and the owner of each factors used to receive 20 
percent of the crop. Thus, a peasant's share in irrigated 
areas varied from 20 percent, when he supplied only his own 
labor, to 60 percent, when he supplied seed and non-human
25power also, and from 25 to 75 percent on dry farming lands.
By the above argument, we do not mean to indicate that 
no attempts had been made to change the system of private 
land ownership before 1962. Actually, during 1906 - 1960, a 
series of land refrom measures were enacted, but their 
collective effect was minor.
Traditionally in Iran, the common method for plowing 
the land was application of ironshod plowshare which with it 
a farmer and a yoke of oxen could plow between one-fourth and 
one-half of an acre in a ten-hour day.
^^Area Handbook for Iran 1978, pp. 336-37.
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The first full land reform program was passed in
1960, and the revised program became law in January 1962.
2 6The program carried on under three different phases, 
and set forth as its goal the massive transfer of lands 
to peasants in all parts of the country. The land reform 
program, insofar as it concerned with the actual process
27of distribution of land, was completed by the early 1970's.
o pIn 1962, it was officially estimated that about 
63 percent of farmer - owners had less than 2.5 acres of 
farmland, 25 percent had 2.5 to 7 acres, and only 12 per­
cent had more than 7 acres. In summarizing the available
data, both from official and unofficial sources, it has 
29been estimated that about 8 percent of farmers obtained 
land during the first phase of land reform (January 1, 1963 - 
September 22, 1968) , while during the second phase (February 22, 
1965 - September 22, 1968), another 6 to 7 percent of them 
received some land, making a total of 14 to 15 percent of 
Iran's farmers as new landowners. Although some data is 
available on the average size of the holdings of these new
2 6First, second and third phase of land reform began 
in 1963, 1965, and 1968 respectively.
27Detailed information may be found in Area Handbook 
for Iran 1971, pp. 406-11; also, J. Bharier, pp. 137-9, and 
Iran Almanac and Book of Facts, 1971, pp. 551-7
7 QArea Handbook for Iran 1971, p. 399.
29Peter Beaumont, Gerald H. Blake, J. Malcolm Wagstaff, 
The Middle East; A  Geographical Study, (New York: John Wiley
and Son, 1976), p. 459.
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landowners, the average tend to be meaningless. The reason 
is that for example, "two or three acres of irrigated, rice 
growing land near the Caspian Sea is vastly more valuable 
than twenty or more acres of marginal nonirrigated land 
near Shiraz or Kerman where only a few acres can be farmed 
in any given year and where droughts are frequent.
In general, the country's agricultural economy is 
distinguished by a variety of types and sizes of production 
units. For example, during the mid-1970's, there were 70 
large units with land holdings of more than 500 hectares 
each, and 250 semi-large units with land holdings of between 
300 and 500 hectares each. These 320 units include agri­
businesses -- operations which combine a variety of farming 
or livestock operations —  farm corporations or joint stock 
companies, agricultural production cooperative and commer­
cial f a r m e r s . B e s i d e s ,  there are 2.2 million peasant 
farmers with an average land holdings of 1.7 hectares each 
and account for 40 percent of Iran's total crop production. 
Generally speaking, despite the importance of 650,000 com­
mercial farmers —  consisting in large part of former land­
lords whose farming plots, ranging in size from 10 to more
^^Area Handbook for Iran 1978, p. 340.
^^For more information about farm organization in 
Iran, see: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Inter­
national Commerce, Iran: A Survey of U.S. Business Op­
portunities , (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
October 1977), pp. 16-41.
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than 2,000 hectares and produce about 50 percent of the 
value added in agriculture —  to country's agriculture, 
the Iranian government policies have neglected them. The 
reasons for ignorance of this sector are government's 
emphasis on small farmers through the development of rural 
cooperatives, farm corporations and the support of agri­
businesses.
The land reform program of 1962 was not without 
critics. Some argued that provision had not been made for 
many of the landless farmworkers. Others indicated that 
some socioeconomic problems, such as availability of in­
struments of production, had been neglected:
as the land reform law gives priority in 
allocating land to cultivators, but does 
not ensure that they actually work the 
land either before or after reform, this 
has meant that the higher status farmers, 
possessing instruments of production, 
were the ones who benefited most from the 
land reform measures. In contrast, the 
sharecropper with only his labor to sell, 
the laborer with regular wages in cash 
or kind, and the casual laborer did not 
benefit at all...about 47.5 percent of 
the rural employed population received 
no land in either the first or second 
phase of land reform. These people still 
remained dependent on the landowners... 
many of the holdings appear to be too 
small to provide adequate returns, no 
matter how efficiently they are m a n a g e d . 33
A more general criticism of the land reform program of 1962
^^Area Handbook for Iran 1978, p. 17, 18, and 22.
33P. Beaumont, G.H. Blake, and J.M. Wagstaff, p. 459.
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held that instead of creating a productive and independent 
peasantry "it lead only to the further consolidation of 
the power of the state over the rural scene...it was the 
central government rather than the peasant farmer that had 
gained at the expense of the unseated landlords.
Although the agricultural sector was the largest 
contributor to Iranian GNP from early 1900, its contribu­
tion declined over time. For example, this sector made up 
about 50 percent of the country's GNP from 1926 - 1950.
In the mid-1960's, this contribution had fallen to 25 per­
cent and it further declined to 15 percent of GNP in Fiscal 
Year (FY) 1971-72.^^
In terms of employment, this sector of the economy
employed 85 percent of the country's workers in 1930, and
3775 percent in 1946. But the employment figure came down
to 40 percent in FY 1973-74 as compared to 56 percent of the
3 8total employment figures in FY 1956-57.
Generally speaking, farming methods in Iran by most 
farmers are still not much different from those used thousands
^^Area Handbook for Iran 1978, p. 340.
Bharier, p. 131.
3 6U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service, Iran; Agricultural Production and Trade, by M.E. 
Kurtig (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April
1974), p. 4.
Bharier, p. 131.
38Echo of Iran, p. 266 and Annual Report and Balance 
Sheet of Bank Markazi Iran 197 3, p. 93.
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of years ago. The vast majority of farmers continue to use 
traditional animal-drawn or hand-operated tools over most 
of the country. For example, it is estimated that steel 
plows are used by less than one-tenth of the farmers. Over 
most of the country, weeding is still done by hand. In­
adequate use is being made of fertilizer and new varieties
39of seeds, and irrigation is frequently random. The 
structure of agricultural production remained basically 
unchanged, and roughly half the total value of crop pro­
duction continued to be made up by wheat, barley, rice,
40tobacco, and cotton output.
As it is discussed in the next sections of this 
chapter, until 1959, Iran was self-sufficient in production 
of some basic foodstuffs, and exported surpluses of some 
crops. But different economic problems, besides rapidly in­
creasing population and droughts, resulted importing of some 
crops, especially wheat, in large amounts to meet the needs 
of the country.
The Fifth Development Plan 
The fifth plan (March 1973 - March 1978), approved 
in early 1973, was revised in mid-1974 because of sharp in­
crease in oil prices and government revenues. Total fixed
^^M.E. Kurtig, pp. 29-35. 
Bharier, p. 133.
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capital investments were raised from Rls 2,460 billion (US 
$36.4 billion) to Rls 4698.8 billion (US $69.6 billion), 
of this total, Rls 3,118.6 billion (US $46.2 billion) was 
to come from public sector, and private sector investments 
accounted for the remaining amounts. Of total fixed capital 
investment, 8 percent (US $5.6 billion) has been allocated 
to the public affairs sector, 27.4 percent (US $19.1 billion) 
to the social affairs sector, and 64.5 percent (US $45 bil­
lion) to the economic affairs s e c t o r . B u t  among the various 
sectors of the economy, the highest priority was given to in­
dustries such as oil, gas, and petrochemical industries.
During the plan period, annual average percent growth 
rate of GNP is estimated^^ at 25.9 (US $54.6 billion by 1978), 
and with annual population growth projection of 2.9 percent, 
per capita real GNP was expected to increase to 106.650 rials 
(US $1,580) by 1978 (from US $555.9 in 1972). In the agricul­
tural sector, with the estimated^^ annual growth rate of 7 
percent, the main target was to attain self-sufficiency in 
basic food items by 1978.
Although some success has been achieved during the
^^For the breakdown of these figures within each sector, 
see the following reference, pp. 20-1.
^^Kayhan Research Associates, A Guide to Iran's Fifth 




first years of the plan (1973 - 1975), nevertheless economic 
expansion on such a large scale created different problems; 
ports became overloaded, skilled labor became scarce, wages 
increased sharply, shortages of goods pushed up prices, and 
inflation soared. For example, during 1973 - 1975, the 
annual growth rate of demand for food (10 percent) was much 
more higher than the growth rate of domestic production (about 
5 percent), and a large amount of agricultural products —  
expecially wheat —  have been i m p o r t e d . H e n c e ,  due to the 
above and other problems, by 1975, the Iranian government 
realized that the revised goals could not be met. According 
to R.E. Looney, although some mechanization of agriculture is 
introduced during the plan period, "there seems little pros­
pect that plans for self-sufficiency in food will be achieved; 
Iran will become a food importer on an increasing scale.
Also, as it is argued by the development economist A.J. 
Kondonassis:
...whether a country would choose to emphasize 
agricultural or industrial development, must 
be decided on the basis of the particular coun­
try's peculiarities and institutional character­
istics. Nevertheless, one thing is relatively 
certain, no matter what the chosen emphasis, that 
agriculture cannot be neglected...an agriculture 
of rising productivity is a necessary prerequisite 
to a successful industrialization.47
^^Robert E. Looney, Iran at the End of the Century, 
(Lexington; D.C. Heath and Co., 1977), p. 35.
4Gibid., p. 41.
^^A.J. Kondonassis, "Contribution of Agriculture to 
Economic Development; The Case of England, U.S.A., Japan and 
Mexico," (Published in Greek in Spoude, 1973); English 
Translation, p. 2.
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Wheat Production in Iran 
Regional and Cultural Aspects of Wheat Production
It is estimated^ that about 5 percent of the world's 
wheat is produced in West Asia, and among the West Asian 
countries, Turkey is the major producer (60 percent), fol­
lowed by Iran (23 percent), Syria (7 percent), and Iraq 
(6 percent).
As indicated in Chapter III, Iran's agriculture con­
sists primarily of crop production, and wheat and barley 
dominate the picture in terms of total area under production. 
Taken together, these two crops account for between 50 and 
94 percent of the area devoted to crop production in all the 
administrative units, with the exception of the western
part of the Caspian lowlands, where rice production is im-
2portant. The basic country's cropping pattern is for wheat 
or barley to be planted every second year, with the land ly­
ing fallow in the intervening period. But, other crop ro­
tations are also common. In general, common rotations are
U.S., Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service, World Demand Prospects for Wheat in 1980, Foreign 
Agricultural Economic Report No. 62 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, July 1970), p. 10.
2Peter Beaumont, Gerald H. Blake, and J. Malcolm 
Wagstaff, The Middle East; A Geographical Study, (New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), p. 453.
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wheat - fallow (9 months) - summer crop - fallow (1 year) - 
wheat, or wheat - fallow (9 months) - summer crop - wheat.^ 
Wheat, the country's main food staple, is grown on 
56 to 60 percent of the total cultivated area —  1/3 irrigated 
and 2/3 dry farming. It is grown in almost all provinces of 
Iran as a winter crop. But the main wheat producing region 
extends from East and West Azerbaijan provinces to Ahavaz, in 
Khuzistan province. Other wheat areas are between Tehran 
(the capital city) and Mashhad, in northeast and around 
Shiraz, in the southwest. Wheat is also grown around Tehran, 
but the production is not enough to supply the needs of the 
densely populated city (Figures 5 and 6). The production of 
this temporary crop usually provides about one-third of the 
total farm cash income.*
Since most of Iran's wheat is grown under rainfed 
conditions —  especially in Eastern Azerbaijan, the Gorgan 
plain, and Khorasan province —  it is estimated^ that a mini­
mum of about 305 millimeters (12 inches) of rainfall is needed 
to ensure a good wheat crop, and less than this amount may 
cause either the total crop failure or sharp reduction in wheat
. Allen LeBaron, Malek M. Mohtadi, and Ivan F. Beutler, 
Long-Term Projections of Supply and Demand for Selected Agri­
cultural Products in Iran, (Logan: Utah State University,
June 1970), p. 101.
*Area Handbook for Iran, (Washington, D.C.: American
University, 1971), p. 383.
^Ibid.
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production. For example, due to poor rainfall, wheat pro­
duction dropped from 4.4 million metric tons in 1968 to about
3.7 million metric tons in 1971 (Table 4).
Although in Iran, wheat acreage has increased through 
some years, the progress in increasing yield is not satis­
factory.^ For example, yield reduced from lj070 kilograms 
per hectare (kg/Ha) in 1934 to 915 kg/Ha in 1968, while 
acreage increased from about 1.8 million hectares to about
4.8 million respectively, (Table 4). One study argues that 
the main reason for this reduction has come through dry 
farming of virgin lands.^ Besides, in most of the wheat 
producing regions, the relative level of technology is quite 
low and mechanization is very limited. Generally speaking, 
except in the highly mechanized areas such as Goran, wheat is 
"harvested by sickle, stacked into large sheaths and left on 
the land. Threshing is done with a sled-like device composed 
of several wooden rollers with iron or wooden teeth. The 
sleds are drawn repeatedly over a layer of wheat bunches 
laid in a 16-20 meter circle. Sometimes mules and donkeys 
are made to trot over the bunches and in some cases, tractors 
are employed. The grain-straw mix is worked inward to a
Yields tend to be low; in many areas irrigated returns 
are little over 1,000 kg/Ha and they are under 500 kg/Ha for 
dry farming.
^Sayeed Mehdi Shafaedin, Economics of Cereal and Flour 
in Iran, (Tehran, Iran: University of Tehran, 1971), p. 103,
and Table 15, p. 104 (in Farsi).
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TABLE 4







1954 2,559,132 2,300 910,
1955 2,741,089 2,6002 920%
1956 2,633,000 2,900 930
1957 3,329,000 2,9842 9372
1958 3,080,000 3,0672 9442
1959 2,929,000 3,150 950
1960 2,923,657 3,703.1 789
1961 2,869,119 3,400 844
1962 2,754,740 3,400 810
1963 2,468,140 3,400 726
1964 2,622,578 3,700 709
1965 3,648,713 4,000 912
1966 4,380,982 4,400 996
1967 4,618,000 4,400 1,050
1968 4,400,000 4,304 915
1969 4,100,000 5,100 824
1970 4,260,000 5,100 336
1971 3,700,000 5,097 726
1972 4,546,000 5,000 900
1973 4,600,000 5,000 920
^Irrigated and non-irrigated areas.
"Estimated by Linear interpolation method based on : Milton
Friedman, The Interpolation of Time Series by Related Series
(New York: National Bureau or Economic Research, Inc., 196:
Source: Production data for period 1954-66 was obtained from:
Statistical Center of Iran, Statistics Related to Economic 
and Social Changes of Iran, (Tehran: Plan Organization,
1976), pp. 92-3, (in Farsi). For year 1967, from:
Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 
(Tehran: Bank Markazi Iran, 1963) , p. lOO. For year
1968, from: Ibid., 1970, p. 116. For period 1969-73
from: Ibid., 1973, p. 174.
Area and yield data for 1954, 1956, and 1959 were ob­
tained from: Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, World Croo Statistics, Area, Production, 
and Yield, ( P.omel FAG, 1966) , p. 7. For year 1960, from : 
Â. leBaron, M.M. Mohtadi, and I.F. Beuther, Long-Term 
Projections of Supply and Demand for Selected Agricultural 
Products in Iran, (Logan: Utah State University, June
157o), p. i and 3. For period 1961-72, from: FAC,
Production Year Book, (Rome, FAO, 1972), p. 53. For 
period 1972-73, from: Ibid., 1974, Vol. 23-1, p. 44.
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central heap. Ultimately the grain is obtained by using
olarge trays to winnow the wheat in a light wind."
In Iran, application of high-yielding wheat varieties, 
which took place first in 1969, have had a limited role in 
increased production. The high-yielding wheats require 
more than just planting a different variety of seed. They 
need improved cultural practices, particularly sufficient 
inputs of fertilizer; more sufficient control of the water 
supply; irrigation; and application of pesticides. Generally 
speaking, the area devoted to the new varieties is limited 
because they are not well adopted to drier regions. It is
9estimated that the total area planted to improved wheats 
was 19,200 hectares in 1969 - 70 and 130,000 hectares in 
1971 - 72.
Agricultural Policy 
Iran's agricultural policies are principally in­
fluenced by a combination of four elements: oil, the national
development program, the reform program, and the weather. 
Although the country's economy is basically agrarian, income 
from petroleum has provided substantial foreign exchange 
and government revenue to support the programs for national 
improvement.
O LeBaron, Mohtadi, and Beutler, p. 102.
gU.S., Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service, Iran: Agricultural Production and Trade, by M.E.
Kurtig (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April
1974), p. 12.
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Generally speaking, the policy is to increase agri­
cultural production to achieve self-sufficiency. For example, 
in 1960, the government introduced an "Impact Program" —  a 
package of supplies of agricultural materials and services 
to farmers —  to improve the efficiency of production. The 
program covers wheat, barley, corn, sorghum, and rice farmers.
Although the government policies are directed toward 
promoting agriculture's role in national development, improve­
ments in agriculture and the increase in farm production have 
not matched the planned annual rate of growth. For example, 
the planned annual growth rate of agricultural production 
during the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1973 - 1978), was 7 percent —  
5.6 percent for crop production and 8.3 percent for live­
stock production. The actual annual growth rate of the 
country's agricultural production during 1963 - 1973 and 
1973 - 1975,- was 3.6 and 4 percent, respectively. Hence, 
the target of 7 percent for the Fifth Plan period appeared 
to be excessively ambitious^® (see the previous sections 
of this chapter). As it is indicated elsewhere in this 
chapter, agriculture in Iran faces a number of problems.
Returns to capital in the past have not been sufficient to 
make agriculture an attractive investment. Until the Fifth 
Plan, agriculture had been largely neglected. The land re­
from program has created new problems in management, credit, 
and marketing.
U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of International 
Commerce, Iran: A Survey of U.S. Business Opportunities,
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 1977)
p. 26.
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Another aspect of Iranian agricultural policy is 
its price p o l i c y . T h e  country has not made extensive 
use of fixed or support prices for agricultural commodities. 
Those that have been used fall into two categories: set
prices for government purchased items, such as cereals, 
and prices paid for products which are controlled under 
the government monopolies such as sugar, tea, tobacco, and 
opium.
It has been argued that wheat is an essential staple 
for most of the population in Iran, and bread is the most 
important single item in the diet everywhere in the country, 
except in certain parts of the Caspian lowlands where con­
sumption of rice is much more important than bread (see 
next section). Hence, a continuing pricing problem which 
has constantly caused concern of the Iranian government is 
the price of bread. The interest of the government in con­
trolling wheat and bread prices began since early 1930's 
and for this purpose, the Bread Administration was established 
in 1933.12
The rest of the discussions in this part are based 
on the following references: Area Handbook for Iran 1971,
p. 483, Area Handbook for Iran 1978, p. 346, S.M. Shafaedin, 
pp. 154-245, and U.S., Department of Agriculture, Economic 
Research Service, Agricultural Policies in Africa and West 
Asia, Foreign Agricultural Economic Report No. 49 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 53.
12The Bread Administration later became the Bread and 
Cereal Administration under the Ministry of Finance and was 
later (1966), transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture. The 
assumed function of this administration is to protect both 
producers and consumers by keeping the cereal prices at a con­
trolled level in all provinces of the country.
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Originally, the government's objective was to buy 
large quantities of wheat at a fixed price in order to 
prevent holdings and speculation, thereby keeping the price 
of bread lower. Thus, before 1956, every producer was re­
quired by law to sell 25 percent of his wheat production to 
the government at the fixed price but was free to sell the 
remainder (75 percent) in the free market. Producers and 
grain merchants.were not permitted by law to ship wheat 
from the areas where the wheat price was lower to the 
other parts of the country where the price was higher. The 
government purchased and sold wheat at different official 
prices and the official prices changed not only from year 
to year, but also they were different for the various pro­
ducing areas. Besides, the official prices were always 
announced after the free market prices have been set and 
the government never announced a specific purchasing policy 
before harvesting.
After 1956, the government decided to change its 
price policy. The open market price of wheat was US $66 a 
ton in 1956. This became the official price at which the 
government would purchase w h e a t . P r o d u c e r s  became free to 
sell all their wheat on the open market and the government
1 3The price was Rls 5,000 (US $66) per ton which re­
mained fixed until 1961. Since 1961, the government set up 
a premium of Rls 1,000 per ton for Bread and Cereal Admin­
istration purchases. Even so, the price paid by the govern­
ment (Rls 6,000, or US $79.20 per ton), is less than the free 
market price.
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has not set fixed prices for cereals since that time. How­
ever, in 1974, the government issued a decree providing price 
supports for most cereals, including wheat, barley, and corn, 
in order to encourage and stabilize crop production.
One of the Iranian government's objective was to buy 
large quantities of wheat, store it, then sell when the open 
market prices were high in order to stabilize the wheat 
price. The government was not successful in following this 
policy due to the following reasons:
1. Due to the shortage of storage facilities, the 
government has not had sufficiently large stocks 
of wheat to supply the open market and thereby 
depress the free market wheat price and prevent 
fluctuation.
2. At the country level, the government has been 
buying very low levels of the domestic wheat 
production.
3. In general, producers of agricultural productions 
benefit from price support if government's official 
price is above the free market price at which 
farmers can sell their products. In Iran, the 
official government's purchased price for wheat 
and barley has been always below the free market
The maximum domestic wheat which is purchased by the 
government never exceeded from 1/10 of the total nation's need, 
and between 1/30 to 1/20 of the total nation's need for wheat 
consumption is usually prepared by the government.
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price and this caused a large amount of hoarding 
and speculation by producers and grain merchants. 
From the above discussion it can be argued that although the 
Iranian government's role in controlling and fixing the price 
of bread^^ (especially in Tehran), has been effective to some 
extent, its role (particularly for the period 1956 - 1973) in 
fixing the price of wheat at a specific level has been neg­
ligible and the price level of this grain actually has been 
set by supply of and demand for wheat in the free market.
Wheat Consumption 
Wheat provides directly about 20 percent of the total 
food calories consumed by the world's population. It is the 
national food staple in about 45 countries, which accounts 
for 35 percent of the world population.
In Iran, cereals, especially wheat, play a role of 
over-whelming importance in the country's population diets. 
Food grains make up two thirds of diet, with wheat making up 
50 p e r c e n t . F o r  example, FAO food consumption balance sheet 
statistics indicate that out of a daily per capita consumption
^^For more information about the Iranian government's 
role in bread price policy, see: S.M. Shafaedin, pp. 13-21.
^^U.S., Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service, World Demand Prospects for Wheat in 1980, Foreign 
Agricultural Economic Report No. 62 (Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1970), p. 39.
^^M.E. Kurtig, p. 28.
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of 2,050 calories, 1,080 were for wheat products and 215 
calories were from rice. The country ranks among the leading 
countries of the world in terms of per capita wheat con-
18sumption (see Table 5). For example, one study estimated
the annual per capita wheat consumption at 120.5 kilograms
(kg.), which is more than 85 percent of per capita consump-
19tion of all cereals. Another study estimated that per 
capita consumption of wheat is about 160 kg. per annum.
The Iranian Statistical Center, in a household budget
20survey study in rural areas in 1963 and 1964, estimated
human consumption of wheat at about 4 million tons per
year. Wheat is not only the main food staple in Iran, but
also the production of different varieties of both winter
and spring wheat provide about one-third of total farm in- 
21come. For example, the study of the Ministry of Agri­
cultural of 107 farm families in the Khozestan Province in 
1965, indicates that the gross per capita output was Rls
13^051 (US $172) , of which Rls 7^08 (US $96) was from wheat 
22production.
^^S.M. Shafaedin, p. 98.
19U.S., Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service, Africa and West Asia Agriculture Situation; Review 
of 1976 and Outlook for 1977, Foreign Agricultural Economic 
Report No. 138 (Washington, B.C.: Government Printing Office,
1977), p. 32.
20Reza Moghaddam, "An Economic Analysis of Wheat Pro­
duction and Marketing in Iran," (Ph.D. dissertation, Oregon 




In Iran, wheat converted to bread is the staple food
of the people living in urban areas and more so for those
who live in villages. The report of the Iran Nutrition
and Foodstuff Institute indicates that 3/4 of the total
calories and 1/2 of protein is sufficient in Iran by the 
23bread. In 1965, the annual per capita bread consumption 
is estimated by the Central Bank of Iran (Bank Markazi Iran) 
at 166 kg. in Tehran, 167 kg. in urban areas, and 210 kg. in 
rural areas.
Besides wheat consumption in the form of bread, wheat
products are consumed in the form of biscuits, confectionery,
macaroni, and flour at homes, hotels and restaurants. In
25each year, it is estimated that about 400 to 500 thousand
tons of wheat are used for seed, and about 10 percent of the
2 6wheat crop is wasted due to smut and delayed harvesting. 
Generally speaking, as it is indicated elsewhere in this 
chapter, wheat is used exclusively for human consumption and 
barley is used mainly as animal feed in Iran.
Time series of official Iranian wheat production and 
trade data are shown in Table 5. The production data in
23Echo of Iran, Iran Almanac and Book of Facts, (Tehran, 
Iran: The Echo of Iran, 1971), p. 280.
24Moghaddam, p. 92.
25Allen LeBaron, Long-Term Projections of Supply and 
Demand for Selected Agricultural Products in Iran, (Logan:
Utah Agricultural Experiment Station, Utah State University, 
June 1970), p. 108.
2 6Moghaddam, p. 16.
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T A B L E  5
WHEAT PRODUCTION, TRADE, DOMESTIC SUPPLY, CONSUMPTION, AND POPULATION, IRAN, 1954-197:
Year Population Production Export Imports Net Trade^
(000) (M.T.) (M.T.) (M.T.) (M.T.)
Gross P.L. 480
1954 19,400 2,559,132 100 3,900 — — — — — 3,800
1955 19,880 2,741,089 0 6,200 28,549 6,200
1956 20,380 2,633,000 0 120,000 61,453 120,000
1957 20,960 3,329,000 0 58,000 74,915 58,000
1958 21,570 3,080,000 100 62,300 40,415 62,200
1959 21,171 2,929,000 0 9,900 2,420 9,900
1960 21,776 2,923,657 0 371,100 2,854 371,100
1961 22,398 2,869,119 0 138,300 265,272 138,300
1962 23,038 2,754,740 0 39,500 121,585 39,500
1963 23,696 2,468,140 0 61,800 213,410 61,800
1964 24,373 2,622,578 0 137,500 47,699 137,500
1965 25,069 3,648,713 0 505,286 249,795 505,286
1966 25,785 4,380,982 0 154,578 217,568 154,578
1967 26,522 4,618,000 74,463 61,805 39,621 -12,658
1968 27,280 4,400,000 210,236 534,695 — “ ——“ 324,459
1969 28,059 4,100,000 41 500 459
1970 28,861 4,260,000 612 22,639 — —- -- 22,027
1971 29,686 2,700,000 3 993,391 103,392 993,388
1972 30,534 4,546,000 1 771,322 230,434 771,321






Year Apparent Utilization^ 
(M.T.)







1954 2,562,932 17.58 2,112,932 108.91
1955 2,747,289 16.41 2,297,289 115.55
1956 2,753,000 17.09 2,303,000 113.00
1957 3,387,000 13.51 2,937,000 140.12
1958 3,142,200 14.61 2,692,200 124.81
1959 2,938,900 15.36 2,488,900 117.56
1960 3,294,757 15.39 2,844,757 130.63
1961 3,007,419 15.68 2,557,419 114.18
1962 2,794,240 16.33 2,344,240 101.75
1963 2,529,940 18.23 2,079,940 87.77
1964 2,760,078 17.15 2,310,078 94.78
1965 4,153,999 12.33 3,703,999 147.75
1966 4,535,560 10.27 4,085,560 158.44
1967 4,605,342 9.74 4,155,342 156.68
1968 4,724,459 10.22 4,274,459 130.09
1969 4,100,459 10.97 3,650,459 132.77
1970 4,282,027 10.56 3,832,027 142.94
1971 4,693,388 12.16 4,243,388 142.94
1972 5,317,321 9.89 4,867,321 159.40







^Production plus net trade. These figures do not exclude 
stock changes of wheat, which also would affect supply.
^Annual seed needs are estimated by one study at 400 thousand 
M.T., and by another study at 500 thousand M.T. The values 
in this Table are based on the average of these two figures,
i.e., 450 thousand M.T., see; LeBaron, p. 108.
^Apparent utilization minus seed.
^Consumption divided by population.
Sources: Population data for 1954-58 were obtained from:
J. Bharier, Economic Development in Iran (1900- 
1970), (London: Oxford University Press, 1971),
p. 27. Data for 1959-73 from: Central Bank of
Iran, National Income of Iran (1959-1972), (Tehran; 
Bank Markazi Iran, 1974), p. 57.
Production data were obtained from Table 4.
Export and gross import data for 1954 were obtained 
from: Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, Trade Yearbook, (Rome, 1957), p. 84. 
Data for 1955-57 from: Ibid., 1959, p. 89. Data
for 1958-60 from: Ibid., 1962, p. 83. Data for
1961-68 from: Ibid., 1972, p. 136 and p. 140. Data
for 1969-73 from Ibid., 1974, pp. 128-29.
Data for import under P.L. 4 80 for 1954-73 were ob­
tained from several tables in: U.S., Department of
Agriculture, Economic Research Service, U.S. Agri­
cultural Exports Under Public Law 480, Foreign 
Agricultural Economic Report No. 395, (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, October 1974),
pp. 130-209.
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this table indicates that wheat production increased 
significantly over the last two decades, yet the increase 
has not been steady. Since most of Iran's wheat is grown 
under dry farming, there has been sharp declines in wheat 
output in years of particularly poor rain. According to 
Table 5, the period 1954 - 1964 was a time of very low 
output. Following this period, production started to in­
crease rapidly, and actually good weather, rather than im­
proved production methods,made this expansion in wheat pro­
duction possible. For example, wheat production declined 
by 13.15 percent in 1971 as compared to output of 1970. The 
main reason for this was the drought of 1970 and poor rain­
fall in the spring of 1971.
In Table 5, per capita consumption estimates of wheat 
are based on official production records, which appear to be 
close to the estimated figures in the studies mentioned in 
this section.
Wheat Trade
Wheat is by far the most widely traded food inter­
nationally. It is also the most highly commercial grain 
crop in the world; in recent years, international trade was 
equal to about one-fifth of the world's wheat crop. Generally 
speaking, wheat trade has supplemented domestic supplies of 
some countries, has complemented supplies of other (for 
blending to improve milling and baking quality), and has been
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the only source of supply for nonproducing countries. It 
has been the major commodity in food aid programs to coun­
tries which do not have the means to improve under normal
27commercial terms.
Until 1959, Iran was self-sufficient in basic food­
stuffs, except tea and sugar, but the drought of 1959 and 
its rapidly increasing population necessitated importing
of basic foodstuffs, such as wheat, in considerable amounts
28to meet the needs of the country.
Wheat is one commodity in which Iran may be either 
an importer or exporter. In general, prior to World War II, 
the country had a surplus of wheat and was a net exporter. 
Following the war, however, the situation changed, and sub­
stantial imports have been required. Wheat imports are now 
larger in value than traditional imports such as tea and 
sugar, and importation of wheat increased to more than 780,000. 
M.T. in some years to meet the needs of the country (see Table 5) 
According to Table 5, small net imports of. sheat were
^^World Demand Prospects for Wheat in 1980, p. 57.
^®In Iran, under the Foreign Trade Monopoly Act of 1933, 
the government has a monopoly over all importing and exporting 
activities, and because of the predominant role of the public 
sector in the national economy, the government is the largest 
importers in the country. The private sector, however, en­
gages in foreign trade in the same manner as under a free 
enterprise system since the same law permits the government to 
delegate the right to function in this area to private sectors. 
For more information on this subject, see: U.S., Department of
Commerce, Industry and Trade Administration, Marketing in Iran, 
Overseas Business Reports No. 77-66 (Washington, B.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, December 1977), pp. 5-9.
93
required until 1964, and then in the period of 1964 - 1966, 
because of a severe winter and a shortage of rain, the coun­
try had to rely on quite sizeable amounts of wheat imports.
In 1967, the country became a net exporter of wheat and ex­
ported about 1^658 M.T. It has been argued that, "the change 
of direction of Iran, from being an importer to a net exporter 
of wheat...attributed to shortage of silos to store the extra
I20stock." After 1967, the country has moved again from the 
position of a net exporter to a position of being a net im­
porter of wheat. In Iran, according to the study by A. LeBaron
The demand for wheat will continue to exceed 
domestic supplies...and unless average wheat 
yields are increased to about 3MT/Ha, sub­
stantial import requirements could be necessary 
in any given years.30
2 9Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 
(Tehran: Bank Markazi Iran, March 1969), p. 143.




The purpose of this chapter is to develop an econometric 
food aid model for the period 1958-73 that can be used in 
testing the effects of the American food aid program under 
Public Law 480 on domestic prices and outputs of wheat in 
Iran.
Economic modeling often involves the question of 
applicability of the functional form and availability of 
data for that form. It is not always possible to adequately 
resolve both questions before beginning a study. Besides,
"the model builder hopes to construct a system that offers a 
structure approximating reality to a degree sufficient for 
theoritical purpose of investigation...and the validity of 
the model is subject to change and depends upon the degree 
of permanence of economic laws as well as that of the state 
of technology."^ Moreover, although agricultural economists 
have made important advances in supply analysis, in farm
Bernard Oury, A Production Model for Wheat and Feed- 
grains in France (1946-1961), (Amsterdam: North-Holland
Publishing Co., 1966), pp. 5-6.
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supply research several important gaps still stand in the
way on the theoretical side (e.g., lack of a theory or at
least techniques for measuring the diffusion of technological
changes). According to T.W. Schultz:
The knowledge we have been able to amass about 
the demand, say, for food is on a much stronger 
footing empirically than is the equivalent 
knowledge about the supply of farm (food) 
products...There are two basic factors that go 
a long way in accounting for the wide disparity 
. in our present knowledge about demand and supply.
Both of these factors indicate that the demand 
concept with which we work rests on a fairly 
stable foundation, whereas the supply concept 
stands on shifting sand...For a function to 
be useful it must either be stable over time, 
or we must be able to predict how it will 
change. The stability of the function underlying 
the demand is dependent upon what happens to
tastes and in case of supply upon technology.
We observe, however, whereas tastes remain 
fairly constant, (i.e., consumers change but 
very slowly their food habits over the years) 
technology does not.2
Generally speaking, agricultural economists have developed 
an impressive number of econometric analyses of individual 
farm commodities, such as wheat, in the past decade. Most of
the investigators developed demand functions in which the own
price, per capita income, and population explained the quantity 
of wheat demanded. The supply function of wheat usually deter­
mines the quantity produced utilizing the past own price, the 
prices of competing grains, weather, and other factors. A 
trend variable frequently is included in the supply function
2Theodore W. Schultz, "Reflections on Agricultural 
Production, Output, and Supply," Journal of Perm Economics, 
38 (August 1956), pp. 749-50.
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to reflect a systematic shift in the entire supply function 
under technological change. Thus, the market price and out­
put of wheat are determined by equating quantities supplied 
with quantities demanded in a market economy.
The market price and quantity of wheat will vary if 
there is a charge in the relevant variables. The effects of 
change in the relevant variables (on price and output of wheat) 
depend upon the elasticities of both demand for and supply 
of wheat, given the sizes of the changes in the relevant 
variables. Thus, it is necessary to identify and measure 
all the relevant variables in both supply and demand equations 
of wheat.
As was noted in the two previous chapters, several 
factors (e.g., environmental, economic, technological, and 
institutional) affect domestic production of wheat in Iran.
For different statistical reasons, but primarily because of 
the lack of data, all relevant variables cannot be introduced 
in time series analysis of supply. Therefore, a quantitative 
wheat model should be based on a few selected factors that 
not only affect the size of the output, but also overcome 
such statistical problems as lack of specification, and 
interrcorrelation between variables in the model.
This chapter is divided into three sections. In order 
to study the impact of P.L. 46 0 wheat imports on prices and 
production of domestically produced wheat in Iran, a theoretical 
framework for analysis is set up in the following steps;
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1. construction of a wheat supply equation based on 
a few selected variables
2. construction of a demand equation based on 
relevant variables, and
3. integration of the supply equation with other 
supply factors, i.e., in order to construct the 
total supply of wheat available for food con­
sumption. Derive a market clearing identity, 
and develop the measures of the elasticities
of domestic prices and output of wheat with 
respect to imported surplus of wheat.
Supply Analysis
The analysis of changes in agricultural output can 
be investigated through empirical data which can be developed 
by measuring the functional relationship between physical in­
puts and outputs in different conditions. Production theory 
consists of an analysis of how managers— given the state of 
arts and a set of price relationships— combine resources to 
produce a specific output or combination of outputs. In this 
case study, the managers are Iranian farmers and the specific 
output is wheat.
In addition to domestic supply, commercial imports,
and food aid shipments provide wheat for domestic consumption 
in Iran. The relevant variables assumed to affect the aggre­
gate annual supply of wheat from domestic production, q^, in 
this study are: (A) land. A, (B) labor, L, (C) capital, K,
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(D) technology, T, (E) price, P, and (F) weather, W. An 
equation in the model can therefore be formulated as:
s
q = S (A, L, K, T, P, W) 
w
Each of these relevant variables will be examined in this 
section.
Land
Despite the fact that it is often realistic to consider 
land as capital, land is sufficiently differentiable to be 
treated as a separate factor of production, or at least as 
a distinct subset of capital. To do so is in accordance 
with the thinking of producers for "the cultivator in low- 
income countries talks and often acts as though land was his 
most significant input. It is by land that he measures his 
economic and social position."^
The concept of land has different meaning to different 
people. One technical concept which has been used by both 
lawyers and economists considers land as "any portion of the 
earth's surface over which ownership rights might be exercised. 
These rights relate...to things which have been attached to 
the surface by nature...and to those objects of value which 
be either above or below surface."^ Hence, when land is
3John W. Mellor, The Economics of Agricultrual Develop­
ment, (London: Cornell University Press, 1966), p. 178.
^Raleigh Barlowe, Land Resource Economics, (England: 
Prentice-Hall Inc., 1960), p. 7.
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considered as a factor in wheat production, it includes its 
fertility, cultivability, climatic condition, and location 
with respect to markets and other areas. Thus, on the supply 
side, the concern is with both the quantity and quality of 
the land which are or can be made available for wheat pro­
duction. The quantity of land available for agricultural use 
at any time usually depends upon the interaction of different 
factors, such as the natural physical characteristics of land, 
economic, institutional, and technological setting within 
which land use takes place.
In Iran, as in most of the LDC's, land is especially 
critical in crop production, because human labor and farm pro­
duced cpaital (i.e., draft animals, wells, and homemade equip­
ment) are "usually" the only resources available to the farmer 
to augment his land's basic production capabilities. Hence, 
the contribution of land to the value of crop production is
high.5
Generally speaking, the farm land owners try to use
Classical economists, who developed the concept of 
law of diminishing returns, regarded the total stock of land 
as a fixed factor of production and assumed that increasing 
population pressure would force more and more intensive use 
of the land factor which the net result would be higher land 
values and higher returns to land owners, but "the present 
prospects with regard to technological development indicate 
this problem is not imminent." In the production process, 
intensity refers to the relative amounts of capital and labor 
combined with units of land, i.e., high ratios of capital and 
labor per unit of land described as intensive use of land. 
Intensive margin in agricultural land use is defined as "the 
point in the cultivation of a given piece of land at which the 
labor and capital used barely pay their costs." In other words, 
the economic point with each grade of land beyond which it does 
not pay to apply additional variable inputs. See: Ibid., pp.143-
44.
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their land in production of those agricultural products 
which will yield the highest return. Of course, the rela­
tive concept of highest and best use of any particular unit 
is often subject to change.
Labor
Another principal input in countries, such as Iran, 
with traditional agriculture is labor. In such countries 
agricultural production is labor intensive. Much of the 
literature on economic development assumes an abundance or 
even excess of labor in the agricultural sector. For example, 
according to W. Arthur Lewis, withdrawals of the unproduc­
tive surplus labor from agricultural production to nonfarm 
jobs will not cause a significant decline in farm production.
Lewis based this proposition on two assumptions:
(1) that zero or very low marginal productivity of labor 
prevails in the subsistence sector (that part of the economy 
which does not use reproducible capital), and (2) that at 
the existing capitalist wage rate, the supply of unskilled 
labor to the capitalist sector (that part of the economy 
which uses reproducible capital and employs wage-labor for 
profit making purposes) is perfectly elastic. An opposite 
view of development assumes that withdrawal of surplus labor 
from agriculture to nonfarm jobs will cause a reduction in
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farm production unless agricultural productivity or imports 
increased.^
In this study, no effort will be made to estimate 
the potential effect of change in the labor supply on wheat 
production, because the agricultural sector of Iran has been 
faced with surplus of labor during the period under considera­
tion.
Capital
The third factor of production is called capital, which
is the link between the past and the future via the present.
Capital is defined as "all things useful in production that
7can be created by investment and destroyed by use." An early 
view of capital was developed by Bohm-Bawerk who regarded 
capital as the result of a process through time and affected 
the average period of production or average period of invest­
ment. Another view, developed by Marx, considered capital as 
composed of the produced means of production (i.e., constant 
capital) and of labor power (i.e., variable capital). A third 
perspective, associated most often with Clark, views capital 
as a commodity used as a factor input, and, commodity capital 
is viewed as having a marginal productivity just as the other
See; W. Arthur Lewis, "Economic Development With Un­
limited Supplies of Labor," The Manchester School of Economics 
and Social Studies, 22 (May 1954): 139-92, and Gerald M. Meier, 
Leading Issues "in Economics, 2nd ed., (England: Oxford
University Press Inc., 1970), pp. 146-62.
^Donald Dewey, Modern Capital Theory, (New York; Columbia 
University Press, 1965), p. 114.
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gfactors of production, labor and land. Therefore, different 
summary measures of capital, each capturing a different aspect 
of industrialization, have been developed by economists. For 
example, applying the average period of production as a measure 
of changes in the plan, J.R. Hicks indicated that "a fall in 
the rate of interest lengthens the average period of the plan 
...Change in the average period is important, but not the 
length of the period itself. The average period measures 
nothing else but the 'crescendo' of the plan; and that has
Qnothing to do with the technical methods of production employed." 
But, a difficulty with any index of capital is that examples 
have been found which lead to pardoxical results. For example, 
concerning the average period of production, J.R. Hicks 
developed an example in which "new processes...have identically 
the same technical character as the old; nevertheless, in 
spite of that, just because they are new processes, under­
taken only because the rate of interest has fallen, their 
inception must raise the average period of the plan."^^
The basis for the productivity of capital is not well 
understood. According to D. Dewey, capital is productive be­
cause "technical progress is a fact of life...the truth is
pEric Roll, A History of Economic Thought, 4th ed., 
(Homewood: Richard D. Irwin Inc., 1974), pp. 251-97, pp. 405-
OS, and pp. 424-34.
qJohn R. Hicks, Value and Capital, 2nd ed., (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1946), p. 220 and p. 223.
l°Ibid., p. 224.
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that to explain capital productivity one would have to explain 
the growth of knowledge itself...it is the existence of a 
body of knowledge that makes possible capital accumulation... 
but a qunatum of knowledge usually has little or no economic 
payoff until it is 'incorporated' or 'embodied' in a set of 
specialized men and m a c h i n e s . A c c o r d i n g  to this argument, 
capital is productive because capital inputs are one of the 
prime carriers of new technology, and new capital often 
involves the introduction of higher technology. Also, when 
a production function combines capital with other inputs no 
satisfactory distinction can be made between capital and 
other factors of production. This is largly due to limita­
tions for dealing with the concept of technical progress 
(knowledge).
The foregoing arguments establish a close relation­
ship between capital and technology. That correlation may be 
so high that they are inseparable so that only one need be 
measured in a model.
It was pointed out in Chapter IV that the agricul­
tural sector of Iran, as in most of the LDC's, is traditional. 
This economic sector of the country includes only a small 
capital inputs. Application of farm machineries, such as
^^Dewey, pp. 7-8, pp. 10-11, and pp. 143.
12For more information see; Ibid., Chapter 9, and 
Johan R. Hicks, Capital and Growth, (New York: Oxford Univer­
sity Press, 1965).
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tractors and combines, are extremely limited. Investment 
in tools and equipments (which tends to be made of local 
materials and are largely a direct embodiment of labor) 
tend to be negligible. Therefore, because of data limita­
tions and in order to avoid the problems of measurement 
which a capital variable would create— due to a very high cor­
relation between measures of capital and technology—  
capital will be deleted from the supply equation in this 
study. And, some specific variable will be used in place 
of both capital and technology in the test equations. This 
point is discussed further in the following pages.
Technology
A problem in production analysis is how to account 
for technology in model building. In some models of economic 
growth, production functions have been used which incorporate 
the contribution of technical change in a technology para­







Z: a constant technology parameter, and a+b = 1.
Technical progress is accounted for by increasing the value 
of "Z" in the above equation. This method for handling
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technology has been criticized^^ because, statistical estimates 
of "Z" are always the residual that cannot be explained by 
increases in capital and labor. "Like any residual, (Z) picks 
up errors in all other estimates insofar as these are not 
offsetting.
An alternative approach is to use surrogate measures 
of the rate of technical advance. For example, time is often 
used as a proxy for measuring technological growth. This 
method is also open to criticism because it assumes that 
technological progress takes place at a uniform rate— a fact 
which in most cases is not true— and that its level cannot 
decline— an assumption open to question.
The preceding methods for handling technology in supply 
analysis are not entirely satisfactory and have been criticized 
by several w r i t e r s . V .  Ruttan said that "until the empirical 
and conceptual limitations...in models employed to measure the 
impact of technological change on resource utilization and out­
put growth...are overcome, empirical measures of technological 
change must be considered as highly provisional, and their use 
in analysis of agricultural supply response will be limited.
^^See: Hicks, Capital and Growth.
14Dewey, p. 147.
^^See: John R. Hicks, Capital and Time, (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1973), Hicks, Capital and Growth, and Schultz, "Reflections 
on Agricultural Production," pp. 74 8-62.
^^Vernon W. Ruttan, "Research on the Economics of Tech­
nological Change in American Agriculture," Journal of Farm 
Economics, 42 (November 1960), p. 746.
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This argument indicates that, in practice, the impact of 
technology appears difficult to capture.
In general, different techniques can be used to in­
crease production of wheat, such as application of high- 
yielding wheat varieties, utilization of more fertilizer, 
mechanization, and irrigation. It was indicated in the two 
previous chapters that because water is the absolute limit­
ing factor in agricultural production of Iran, little use 
is made of better wheat varieties. Also the farming method 
used by most farmers in that country are still not much dif­
ferent from those used thousands of years ago. The main 
technique available to increase production of crops in coun­
tries, such as Iran, that employ traditional agricultrual 
methods is the application of larger quantities of fertilizer. 
Both theoretical arguments and empirical researches support 
this proposition by indicating a positive relationship be­
tween the yields of various crops and fertilizer utiliza­
tion. In several studies, the amount of fertilizer used not 
only provided the best single indicator of the yields of 
various crops but also accounted for a high percent of the 
yield varation among different regions of the w o r l d . F o r  
example, in both North Africa and West Asia the response of 
wheat output to a complete fertilizer composed of nitrogen (N),
^^John Clark and Sam Cole, "Models of World Food Supply, 
Demand and Nutrition," Food Policy, (February 1976), p. 136.
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18phosphate (P), and potash (K) varied from 2.4 to 8.2 Kilo-
19grams of wheat per Kilogram of fertilizer nutrient.
Based on the foregoing arguments, therefore, utiliza­
tion of fertilizer will be used in place of both capital and 
technological variables in the constraction of wheat model 
production in this study.
Price ‘
As explained in Chapter II, peasant farmers do re­
spond to price. The question is to what price do they re­
spond, and how do they form their expectation?
In general, since agricultural production takes time, 
farmers cannot quickly adjust their output to existing market 
prices. A farmer cannot decide every day how much or what 
to produce that day according to the market situation. He 
"usually" makes his production plan according to market 
prices and expectations prevailing in the fall and output 
appears only during the following summer (lagged adjustment).
A well-known example of lagged adjustment in a single market 
with lagged supply reactions is the market for winter wheat.
An assumption often made is that the farmer's price expecta­
tions are essentailly based on past prices, with the immediate
18Note that fertilizer could be measured in many dif­
ferent ways. For example, USDA measures fertilizer use in terms 
of total quantities of the three principal plant nutrients, i.e., 
N, P, and K. The measure is called "principal plant nutrients."
19C. Peter Timmer, "The Demand for Fertilizer in Developing 
Countries," Food Research Institute Studies in Agricultural 
Economics, Trade and Development, 13 (1974), Table 1, p. 200.
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20past carrying the biggest weight. One of the most fre­
quently used models of weightings in agricultural supply 
reaction is that of a Nerlove system.
In 1958, Marc Nerlove published a study of the supply 
responsiveness of U.S. farmers. In his model, farmer re­
actions were based on price expectations and/or area adjust­
ments. He restricted his arguments to the problems of dis­
tinguishing empirically between the short-and long-run re-
21sponses to change in price exceptions. The basic assump­
tion behind his model is that "farmers react, not to last 
year's price, but rather to the price they expect, and this 
expected price depends only to a limited extent on what last 
year's price was...and that the influence of more recent
prices should be greater than the influence of less recent 
22prices." Thus, he used a sort of geometrically declining
23distributed lag structure based on Koyck's 1954 work.
More precisely, Nerlove hypothesized that "each year
20Based on this assumption, several methods of assign­
ing weights have been developed. For this and a good survey 
of the econometric evidence see: Hossein Askari, and J. Thomas 
Cummings, Agricultural Supply Response: A Survey of the
Econometric Evidence, (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc.,
1976).
21Marc Nerlove, The Dynamic of Supply: Estimation of
Farmers' Response to Price, (Baltimore: John Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 1958).
22Mark Nerlove, "Estimates of the Elasticities of Supply 
of Selected Agricultural Commodities," Journal of Farm Economics, 
38 (May 1956), pp. 498-99.
23L.M. Koyck, Distributed Lags and Investment Analysis, 
(Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1954).
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fanners revise the price they expected to prevail in the
coining year in proportion to the error they made in predicting
price this p e r i o d . I n  other words, it is assumed that in
25each period farmers revise their notion of "normal" price 
in proportion to the difference between the then current 
price and their previous idea of "normal" price. Mathematical­
ly the above hypothesis may be stated as:
e e e
1. P - P  = B ( P  - P ) , 0 < B < 1
t t-1 t-1 t-1
where:
e
P: expected "normal" price this year
t
e
P: expected "normal" price last year
t-1
B: the coefficient of expectation, i.e., proportion
of the error by which farmers revise their expecta-
2 6tions, which assumed to be a constant
P : actual price last year
t-1
^^Nerlove, "Estimates of the Elasticities," p. 500.
25The average level about which future prices are expected 
to fluctuate is called expected "normal" price, see: Nerlove,
The Dynamics of Supply, p. 25.
2 6Note that B is called the elasticity or coefficient of 
expectation according to whether | and P are expressed in loga­
rithms or not, in other words, "if | and P represent the loga­
rithms of expected normal price and actual price respectively, 
then B i| Hicks' elasticity of expectation, since:
3 I
B = --------- . If f and P are taken as the absolute levels of
3 1-1
expected normal and actual price...it is called coefficient of 
expectation. The model used here is derived from Hicks' defini­
tion of the elasticity of expectation by assuming that the elasti­
city is a constant or at least that it depends on variables 
other than prices." See: Ibid., p. 53.
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The Nerlove hypothesis, stated in equation 1, is 
equivalent to one in which expected "normal" price is repre­
sented as a weighted moving average of past prices with the 
weights as a function of B. This can be seen if equation 1 
is rewritten as;
e e
2. P = BP , + (1-B) P
t t-1
which is a first order difference equation in expected price, 
with the following solution:
® 23. P = BP + B Cl-B) P + B (1-B) P .
t t-1 t-2 t-3
Equation 3 shows that the closer the coefficient of
expectation, B, is to unity, the smaller the number of past
prices needed to approximate the expected price. Or stated
differently, "the closer is the coefficient of expectation
to zero, that is the greater the tenacity with which farmers
cling to their previous expectations, the greater will be
27the number of past prices we cannot ignore." Thus, in 
order to estimate the effect of the change in actual price 
on the expected level of future prices, equation 3 may be 
used.
Nerlove then turns his attention from short-run
^^Nerlove, "Estimates of the Elasticities," p. 501.
Ill
adjustments to the long-run. He used the hypothesis, stated
in equation 1, "that farmers revise their expectations by a
2 Rportion of the error they make in prediction" to obtain 
estimates both of the elasticity of acreage to expected price, 
and of the coefficient of expectation.
The reaction, over time, to changes in price expecta­
tion, can be expressed in terms of the relationship between 
prices and output (production). According to Nerlove, planned 
output, which can be expressed by planted or harvested acreage, 
is a linear function of expected price as:
4. A = a^ + a, P + U.^ O 1 t t
Equation 4 is called acreage or supply response function to 
price where:
A^: acreage planted this year
a^: coefficient of expectation
: error term
Equation 4 means that any expected price can be written
as a linear function of acreage, A^. Hence, last year's ex- 
e
pected price, P , can be expressed by last year's acreage, 
t-1
&t-l'





6. ?t-l ^ \ - l / ^ l  ~ ^q/^I “ ^t-l/^l 
Substituting equation 6 for expected price in last
e
year, P^_^, into equation 1, and then substituting the result
e
for expected price in this year, P^, into acreage response 
function, equation 4, the following relationship is obtained:
7. B + (1-B! At_i +
where is a random residual i.e., - (1-B) U^_^,
and other variables have the same meaning as before. Equation 
7 expresses acreage planted this year (observed acreage) in 
terms of actual prices in last year (lagged observed price) 
and last year's acreage (lagged observed acreage). This 
equation is derived on the assumption that observed acreage 
represents desired acreage, i.e., desired acreage is the same 
as observed acreage. Thus, in order to estimate the effect 
of a change in the expected level of future prices on the 
long-run level of output or production, equation 7 may be 
used.
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Nerlove computed supply elasticities for wheat, and
29other grains, by using the above approach.
2 9Note that the estimates of the elasticities of acreage 
with respect to expected normal price, a^ in equation 4, pro­
vide evidence on the elasticities of supply or planned output.
In other words, the elasticity of acreage with respect to 
expected normal price represents a lower limit to the elasticity 
of supply, see; Ibid., p. 508.
Of course, a Nerlovian production or supply model will 
result in two estimates of price elasticity of supply, a 
short-run and a long-run estimate. The short-run estimate is 
associated with the actual or observed price, P^, and the 
long-run estimate is related to expected normal price, P. , in 
the supply equation. Therefore, statistical estimation of the 
variables in equation 7 can be used in order to estimate both 
the short-run and the long-run elasticities of supply.
Going back to equation 7 :
B + *1 B ?t-l + (1-B) h -1  + \
7'- At = Bt-1 + At-1 + Vt
by using least squares method, estimates of II , 11̂ , and Hg in 
equation 7' provide estimates of a , a^, and B in equation 7.
Note that if the variables°in equation 7 are in the loga­
rithms, the short-run elasticity of supply with respect to its 
relative price is given by the estimate of a, B, i.e., IÎ  in 





' 1 - "(1-B) = r - ^ '  Because B = 1 - (1-B)
Therefore, B, coefficient of expectation, determines the rela­
tion among the short-run and the long-run elasticities of supply 
of output, i.e., the factors which cause the difference between 
the short-run and the long-run elasticities of supply determine 
B. If acreage and price in equation 7 are not expressed as 
logarithms, then all elasticities should be taken at the mean 
values of acreage and actual (observed) price. See; Nerlove,
The Dynamics of Supply, p, 202, and Chpater 8 and 9, Marc Nerlove 
"Distributed Lags and Estimation of Long-Run Supply and Demand 
Elasticities; Theoretical Consideration," Journal of Farm Economics 
40 (May 1958); 301-11, and Marc Nerlove and William Addison, 
"Statistical Estimation of Long-Run Elasticities of Supply and 
Demand," Journal of Farm Economics, 40 (November 1958); 861-80. 
Short-run and long-run are used throughout this study in the 
Marshallian sense that both consumers and producers require 
some time to adjust fully to a price change.
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In this study, the magnitude of price elasticity of 
domestic supply of wheat with respect to its own price will 
be calculated by using a Nerlovian production model, and 
equation 7 will be used as the basis of the acreage or supply 
response model-
Weather
Agricultural output is often related through a pro­
duction function to land, labor, and capital inputs. Such a 
general function usually neglects the role of weather^^ as a 
highly important exogenous factor of production. But the 
question is how weather variables enter the supply model 
needed to meet the objective’ of this study. One suggestion 
by B. Oury is that "rainfall, temperature... as well as many 
other weather factors can be thought of in terms of "noncost" 
inputs to the production process and can enter the production 
model on an equal footing with other i n p u t s . T h u s ,  in 
supply analysis there is a need for a variable (or variables) 
to account for the varation in production (yield) due to 
weather. But, the inclusion of weather variables in a supply 
model requires the development of an adequate measure of 
weather.
In this study, weather is defined as those meteoro­
logical phenomena (i.e., rainfall and temperature) affecting 
wheat production (yield) within a growing season.
31Bernard Oury, "Allowing for Weather in Crop Production 
Model Building," Journal of Farm Economics, 47 (May 1965), p.. 270,
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Direct measures of weather, such as rainfall and 
temperature, have not been utilized by most researchers in 
supply analysis. For example, B. Oury, J. Stallings, and 
L. Shaw rejected the direct use of meteorological variables 
primarily on the grounds that the functional relationship
32between these variables and production (yield) is not known.
Therefore, an alternative approach, of measuring the effects
of weather on production or yield, has been proposed— the
weather index approach. According to L. Shaw:
The question of the exact cause and effect 
relationship between yeild and an individual 
meteorological variable is avoided in the 
procedures used to construct weather indexes.
The difficulties associated with those statistical 
attempts at measuring the influence of weather, 
which require detailed specification of impor­
tant variables and their functional relationships 
to yield, are perhaps insuperable...The weather 
index approach attempts to provide many of the 
same answers as elaborate cause and effect 
studies, but on a more moderate scale. Once 
some indication of the overall effect of weather 
on crop yields and production is available, 
researchers will have a better base to work 
with in investigating the "why" of weather-the 
cause and effect relationships of individual 
meteorological f a c t o r s . ^3
In crop production model buildings several different 
kinds of weather indexes have been used to assess the impacts 
of weather on the outputs. For example, Shaw and Stallings 
determined the weather index by comparing actual yields to
Ibid., p. 271, Lawrence H. Shaw, "The Effect of Weather 
on Agricutlural Output: A Look at Methodology," Journal of Farm 
Economics, 46 (February 1964), pp. 220-22, and James L. Stallings, 
"Weather and Crop Yields: A Measure of the Influence of Weather 




trend yields, and Oury has suggested an index based on the 
soil m o i s t u r e . A  very common and simple weather index 
which has been used in crop production model building is 
the De Martonne index (a French climatologist).
The index, known as an aridity index, was used by 
De Martonne to classify climatic areas. Aridity index has 
also been used by others, including Oury's study of wheat 
and foodgrains production in France, for measuring the 
weather influence on production. According to Oury "the 
main influence of weather upon crop yield appears to exert 
itself through the moisture level. The De Martonne aridity 
index which combines precipitation and temperature have 
been shown to reflect such weather influences...statistically 
speaking, the use of such an index in place of both rainfall 
and temperature linearly helps to eliminate the built-in 
effect of intercorrelation between precipitation and temp­
erature."^^
The De Martonne index can be written for the year period
as:
(A) I = P/T + 10
where
I: index number
^^See the references in Footnote 32.
^^Oury, A Production Model for Wheat in France, p. 34, 
and p. 85, and for more information about suitability of using 
the aridity index see Chapter III of this book and Oury, "Al­
lowing for Weather in Crop Production," pp. 282-83.
117
P: annual total precipitation in millimeters
T: annual mean temperature in centigrade
On the monthly basis, the index can be written as:
I =
or, for any number of cumulated months, the index can be 
calculated as:
ill (Pj.) ' 2   ̂ (P.) * 12
(C) I = —  S-------------- S-Jcl--- i--------> 1=1...n
I (T\) 1 n
^ — + 1 °  -
where:
P: monthly rainfall for month i in millimeters (mm)
T: average monthly temperature for month i expressed
in degrees centigrade (°C) 
i: stands for ith month
n: number of months in the period referred to
These aridity indexes. A, B, and C, show that "the 
higher the temperature and/or the lower the rainfall, the 
lower is the aridity index. Then a low aridity index means 
a low degree of moisture and a high index means a high degree 
of moisture, or excessive h u m i d i t y . A  value of the De 
Martonne index below 20 (I < 20) usually indicated drought 
conditions.
3 6Oury, A Production Model for Wheat in France, pp. 27-8.
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Demand Analysis 
The quantity of demand for wheat, Q°, is affected 
by a number of variables, the most important of which are: 
the price of wheat, P; the price of closely related goods,
Pq ,* consumer's income, Y; consumers' tastes, T; and the 
number of consumers, ^Qp* ^  equation can therefore be 
formulated linearly in the general form as:
Qw = ° 'P' ®o' T, Pop)
Wheat constitutes a major food in Iran. As a pri­
mary food staple, it accounts for 50 percent of the diet of 
Iran's population, and the country ranks among the leading
countries of the world in terms of per capita wheat consump- 
37tion. There was no evident change in tastes away from 
wheat consumption to other grains during the period under 
investigation. Neither has there been a significant effect 
from changes in the price of closely related goods. In fact 
no closely related substitute grains of significance exist. 
For these reasons the variables P^ and T will be taken to be 
stable and therefore may be ignored in the construction of a 
wheat demand function for Iran. Thus, the above equation may 
be shortened to:
q“ = D (P, Ï ,  Pop,
Changes in income will shift demand since wheat is a
37For more information see Chapter IV of this study.
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normal (or superior) good in most of the LDC's. This was 
concluded in a study by the USDA which found that for most
OpLDC's the income elasticity of demand for wheat is positive.
This conclusion was supported by the findings of a World
Bank's study which found that although the income of LDC's
expected to increase but the character of their demand for
food cannot be expected to change very much, i.e., they will%
39continue to be heavily dependent on grains. Thus as in­
come increases, the demand for wheat will also increase.
Similarly as the population grows the demand for wheat 
will increase because the market demand is the summation of 
individual demands.
A Food Aid Model 
The market price of a specific output is determined 
by both demand for and supply of that output if supply and 
demand are unrestrained. Suppose that domestic supply of 
and demand for wheat determine its market price in a hypo­
thetical country. The effect of the importation of a certain 
amount of wheat aid under P.L. 480 is the shifting of the 
domestic supply to the right by an amount equal to the aid.
38U.S., Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service, World Demand Prospects for Wheat in 1980, Foreign 
Agricultural Economic Report No. 62 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, July 1970) , p. 43.
3 9U.S., Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service, The World Food Situation and Prospects to 1985, Foreign 
Agricultural Economic Report No. 98 (Washington, D.C.: Govern­
ment Printing Office, December 1974) , p. 78.
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Under this situation, domestic wheat price is expected to 
fall if domestic demand stays constant, i.e., if supply 
curve shifts, but the demand curve remains constant, observed 
price-output combinations will trace out the demand curve.
But will there be a reduction in domestic production of 
wheat due to the aid? To answer this question, it is 
necessary to provide an estimation of the effects of wheat 
shipments under P.L. 480 on domestic wheat output in the 
subsequent years.
In general, estimation of negative production im­
pacts resulting from P.L. 480 wheat shipments rests heavily 
on measurement of price changes and related production re­
sponse. Thus, the problem is to determine the effect on 
domestic price of wheat in a recipient country due to an 
"increase" in the wheat availability made up by P.L. 480 
wheat imports. The price-output effects of wheat shipments 





FIGURE 10. MARKET DEMAND FOR AND SUPPLY OF WHEAT IN A 
HYPOTHETICAL COUNTRY.
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Suppose, as a working hypothesis, that wheat imported 
surplus in the face of a stable demand, such as in Figure 
10, will have a depressing effect on price, which, in turn, 
will tend to reduce domestic wheat production of a hypo­
thetical country. Assume initially that the domestic wheat 
supply curve of the country in question is perfectly in­
elastic and is represented by 8^ in Figure 10. Thus, before 
the importation of wheat aid, the quantity purchased is Oq^ 
and the market price is OP^. The effect of the importation 
of a certain amount, say I = q^q^, of wheat is to shift Sq 
to the right, by an amount equal to I or q^q^, to Sq . The 
total quantity of wheat available for domestic consumption 
then is Oq^ and price is OPg. The change in the domestic 
quantity demanded due to the shipments of wheat is dQ^ = q^q^
= I with no change in domestic production. Hence, the amount 
of the "increase" in the quantity of wheat availability 
made up by P.L. 480 wheat shipments for domestic consumption, 
I', is equal to the change in the domestic quantity demanded 
due to the shipments, dQ^, which, in turn, is equal to the 
total shipments, I. In other words. I' = dQ^ = I = q^q^.
Under the above conditions, one could compute the 
absolute value of the quantity elasticity of demand at point 
A in Figure 10 as;
8. |Ej = dP/P f dO^/Oq^ = dP/P t dl/D = dP/dl • D/P
where :
D = Oq^: total quantity of wheat available for domestic
consumption
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dP/dl; slope of the demand curve
dP/dl • D/P: inverse of the elasticity of demand
with respect to price, and
I' = I.
Equation 8 indicates that the price effect of the imported 
wheat is equal to the inverse of the elasticity of demand 
with respect to price if domestic supply is perfectly in­
elastic, Since all values in the right hand terms are 
empirically determinable, equation 8 is empirically viable; 
but it is theoretically suspect because it assumes that 
elasticity of domestic supply is zero.
Now suppose that elasticity of domestic supply is not 
zero and the situation is as represented by and 82 in 
Figure 10. In this case, the effect of the importation of a 
certain amount, say I = q^qg = q^q^, of wheat aid is an in­
crease in the quantity demanded domestically, dQ̂ ., by only 
q^q2 not q^qg because quantity of domestic production is 
expected to decline by q^q^ due to the shipments. Therefore, 
when the elasticity of domestic supply is not zero dQ^ / I, 
and to assume that they are equal will give a value of elas­
ticity which is greater than the true value. In other words, 
the reduction in domestic price of wheat due to the wheat 
aid will be overstated if it is assumed that dQ^ = I, i.e.,
Pg instead of Pg in Figure 10. One technique to handel the 
problem under this situation is as follows.
In Figure 10, it is argued that the quantity of domestic 
production will decline by q^q^ if wheat is imported. But this
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reduction is more than compensated for by the total wheat 
aid, I = g^qg. The amount of the net increase in the quan­
tity of wheat made available for domestic consumption by 
P.L. 480 wheat shipments. I', actually is only q^qg which
is dQ^. In other words. I' = dQ^ = q^qg < I = q^qg = q^q^.
Now under the above conditions, one could measure the 
effect on domestic price of wheat in a recipient country due
to one percentage change in the amount of the "increase" in
wheat availability made up by P.L. 480 wheat imports by 
computing the absolute value of the quantity elasticity of 
demand at point A' in Figure 10 as:
9. |E| = dP/P T doyoqg = dP/P f I'/D = dP/I' • D/P
where :
D = Oqg: total quantity of wheat available for
domestic consumption 
dP/I': slope of the demand curve, and
I' < I = q^qg = q^q^'
Since all values of right hand terms in equation 9 are 
determinable, it is empirically viable. Because it assumes 
that domestic supply is not perfectly inelastic, equation 9 
indicates that the price effect of the imported wheat under 
P.L. 480 cannot be measured by the inverse of the elasticity 
of demand with respect to price when elasticity of domestic
supply is not equal to zero.
In the above simple model, it is assumed that demand
is stable and both supply and demand are a function only of
the price of the good in question. None of these assumptions
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is true. Therefore in order to develop a food aid model 
which can be used to attain the objectives of this study, 
it is necessary to work with supply and demand equations, 
similar to the ones developed in section 1 and 2 of this 
chapter, which do not reflect these assumptions. A re­
vised model is required.
The model which is developed below is similar to the 
one developed by A.L. Coffing which in turn was adapted from 
the models of F.M. Fisher and G.L. Seevers.^^ The reason 
for adopting the following model is that it is the most ap­
propriate one to the objectives of this study and especially 
for the case of Iran where imports and exports of wheat are 
completely controlled by the government, and P.L. 480 wheat 
imports enter the market in the same way as domestically 
produced commodities and influence prices in the same way 
as an equivalent amount of additional domestic output.
The analysis of section 1 in this chapter, suggests 
that the aggregate annual supply of wheat from domestic out­
put, q^, is a function of the number of areas under cultiva­
tion, A; price, P; fertilizer, F; technology, T; and weather, W;
Arthur L. Coffing, "P.L. Imports, the Disincentive 
Effects, and Implications for Development in Turkey," (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Iowa State University, 1974), Franklin M. Fisher, 
"A Theoretical Analysis of the Impact of Food Surplus Disposal 
on Agricultural Production in Recipient Countries," Journal 
of Farm Economics, 45 (November 1963); 863-75, and G.L.
Seevers, "An Evaluation of the Disincentive Effects Caused 
by P.L. 480 Shipments," American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, 50 (August 1968) : 630-42.
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10. qS = S (A, P, F, T, W)
Since by definition, wheat production is simply the product 
of area. A, and yield, y, therefore equation 10 can be written 
as:*l
11. q® = S P, F, T, W)
Commercial imports, M, and P.L. 480 wheat shipments. I, aug­
ment the domestically produced wheat available for domestic
consumption. Hence, the total quantity of wheat available
Cfor domestic food consumptions, Q„, may be written as:
12. = q® + M + I - X - q
or:
13. = S P, F, T, W) + M + I - X - q
where, A^_^ is the area or acreage planted in wheat in last 
year, X is commercial wheat exports, q in nonfood wheat de­
mand, and other variables have the same meaning as before.
As estimated by Iranian officials, domestic wheat 
output is simply the product of estimated area. A, and yield, 
y. This indirect method of estimation of output implies 
that domestic wheat production, q®, is a function of the 
same inputs that affect both area and yield. Since area 
will be estimated by a distributed lag model of the form 
similar to a Nerlovian production model of section 1 in 
this chapter, e.g.. At = f (At-l, P). And, because yield 
of wheat can be thought as a function of fertilizer utiliza­
tion, F; mechanization, T; and weather, W, i.e., y = f 
(F , T, W). Hence, domestic supply of wheat, q^^can be 
represented as: q^ = A • y = S (At_i, P, F, T, w) which is 
equation 11.
^^The price variable will be defined in real terms, 
that is, nominal wheat prices will be deflated by wholesale 
price index to remove general inflationary or deflationary 
price movement. Although I is clearly a policy variable, M 
could be viewed as an endogenous variable functionally related 
to world and domestic prices and to other variables. Because 
Iran controls commercial imports, they are also viewed here as 
subject to policy determination. Other exogenous variables are 
utilization of fertilizer in wheat production, F, and weather, W.
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The analysis of section 2 in this chapter, suggests 
that the total domestic demand for wheat for food consumption,
Q^, may be written as:
14. Q° = D (P, Ï, Pgp)
where:
P; price of wheat at the producer level
Y: real income or per capita national income
Pgp: number of consumers or population 
Note that one feature of equation 14 is "the exclusion of 
consumption goods other than wheat, that is, the cross elas­
ticities are all zero. The...model treats demand of producers
for their own output as a part of total demand and consequently
domestic supply (equation 11) represents total output rather
43than marketed surplus."
The market clearing equation is:
or:
16. S (A^_i, P, F, T, W) + M + I - X - q = D (P, Y, P^^) 
Taking the total differential of equation 16 with respect to I
and divide through by dl yields:
3S dAt-l , 3S dP . 3S dF , 98 dT
" d T -  ■^9P dï'^âF dï'^âr dït-1
98 dW . dM dX dq _ 9D dP . 9D dY , 9D dP„„
sw dï + â î - d ï - â i + ^ ' â p  dï + 3Ÿ dï + âp—  d ï ^op
In order to concentrate primarily on the price-output 
effects of P.L. 480 shipments, the following assumption is made:
^^8eevers, p. 632.
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dAt-l = = = = dPpp ^ n
dl dl dl dl dl dl dl
Hence, equation 17 can be rewritten as:
TO as dP dM ^ _ 3D dP . 3D dY
1®- 5p d ï ' ^ d ï ^ ^ - â p  d ï ' ^ s Ÿ  dï
If equation 18 is multiplied by selected coefficients whose
product is 1, then:
19. If g , f | H f f ,  ( § , . 1  =
3D dP (D P. + 3D dY Y D
3P dl ̂ P 3Y dl Y^
or:
3S P dP D S ^ dM D ^ , 3D P dP D . 3D Y dY D
3P S d Ï P D ' ^ d Î D ' ^ ^ ' â P D M P ' ^ â Ÿ D d ï Ÿ
converting equation 20 to elasticities yields:
21. E(S,P) E(P,I) S/D + E(M,I) + 1 =
E(D,P) E(P,I) + E(D,Y) E(Y,I)
where:
E(S,P): elasticity of domestic supply with respect to
price
E(P,I): elasticity of price with respect to P.L. 480
shipments, i.e., the percentage change in 
domestic wheat price induced by a one percent 
change in the wheat availability caused by P.L. 
480 wheat shipments
S/D: ratio of quantity domestically supplied to
total quantity demanded
E(M,I): elasticity of commercial imports with respect
to P.L. 480 shipments
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E(D,P): elasticity of domestic demand with respect
to price
E(D,Y): elasticity of domestic demand with respect
to income
E(Y,I): elasticity of income with respect to P.L.
480 shipments 
For simplicity, add the following assumption:
E(M,I) = 0
then equation 21 can be written as:
22. E(S,P) E(P,I) S/D - E(D,P) E(P,I) = E(D,Y) E(Y,I) - 1
or:
23 E(P I) = ECD,Y) E(Y,I) - 1  ̂ S/D E(S,P) - E(D,P)
Equation 23 can be used in order to estimate the negative 
price impacts resulting from P.L. 480 shipments. But the 
unknown variables in this equation are E(D,P), E(D,Y), E(S,P) 
and E(Y,I). Therefore, in order to solve the equation for 
value of E(P,I) it is necessary to estimate the unknown vari­
ables.
Because estimation of price and income elasticity of 
demand for wheat production in Iran are not available, it 
is necessary to provide original estimates of E(D,P), and 
E(D,Y) in equation 23. Since per capita demand is a function 
of the price of the product in question, real income of the 
consumers, and the price of closely related goods; therefore, 
a relationship can be stated as:
24. qd = f (P, Y, Pg)
where;
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q^: per capita demand or consumption for wheat
P: price of wheat
Y: real income level of consumers
Pg: price of substitute, goods
Different forms of demand function expressed in equation 24, 
i.e., linear, semi-log, double log, and log inverse, will be 
tested. Price and income elasticities will be calculated 
for each form.
The magnitude of price elasticity of domestic supply, 
E(S,P), will be calculated by using a Nerlovian production 
model. As it was pointed out in section 1 of this chapter, 
the estimates of the elasticities of acreage with respect 
to expected normal price provide evidence on the elasticities 
of supply or planned output.
The other unknown in equation 23 is E(Y,I). In this 
study, the elasticity of income with respect to P.L. 480 wheat 
imports will be assumed to be equal to the ratio between national 
income and national income from wheat production. In other 
words, E(Y,I) will be assumed to be equal to its average value,
i.e., the proporation of national income derived from wheat.
The reason for this assumption is that any increase in P.L. 480 
shipments of wheat represents an increase in real income and
44See Footnote 29 in this chapter.
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that increase will be the same as the historic proportion 
of real national income derived from wheat production.
After all unknown variables in equation 23 are calcu­
lated by the procedures discussed above, the equation can 
be solved for the value of the price elasticity with respect 
to P.L. 480 imports, E(P,I).
It was pointed out at the beginning of this section 
that consideration of the supply elasticity of domestic 
wheat production with respect to wheat aid is essential for 
an understanding of the potential impacts of wheat imports 
under P.L. 480 on domestic output of wheat in a recipient 
country. The percentage change in domestic wheat output 
induced by a one percent change in the wheat availability 
caused by P.L. 480 wheat shipments, E(S,I), can be determined 
by multiplying equation 23 by the coefficient of the elasticity 
of domestic supply with respect-to price, E(S,P). In other 
words, by définition:
25. E(S,I) = E(P,I) E(S,P)
Hence, the major objective of this study of determining 
the price-output effects of P.L. 480 wheat shipments can be 
accomplished by using equation 23 and 25. The simplifying 
assumptions made in this section are restrictive but the effects 
on the results of relaxing the assumptions will be considered.
^^For mathematical proof of the assumption see: Coffing, 
pp. 148-49.
4Ggince E(P,I) = dP/P f dl/D, and E(S,P) = dS/S t dP/P 
thenE(P,I) E(S,P) = (dP/P • D/dl) (dS/S • P/dP) = dS/S f dl/D = 
E(S,I), see: Seevers, p. 633, and Chapter II of this study.
CHAPTER VI
APPLICATION OF THE FOOD AID MODEL
In Chapter V, a basic relationship for quantifying the 
role of food aid in the wheat production of Iran was developed. 
The relationship specified that the elasticity of supply with 
respect to P.L. 480 shipments, E(S,I), is equal to the product 
of elasticity of price with respect to P.L. 480 imports, E(P,I), 
and the elasticity of domestic supply with respect to price,
E (S,P), that is:
25. E(S,I) = E(P,I) • E{S,P)
The Nerlovian production model developed in the previous 
chapter enables one to calculate the magnitude of E(S,P), 
whcih leaves E(P,I) as an unknown in the above equation.
Equation 23 Cahpter V stated:
23 E(P I) = E(D,Y) E(Y,I) - 1' ' ' S/D E(S,P) + |E(D,P) I
The unknown variables in the above equation are E(D,P),
E(D,Y), E(S,P), E(Y,I) and S/D. Therefore, the equation 




Estimation of the Unknown Variables
Estimating Demand Elasticities 
The different forms of demand functions used in this 
study to estimate the price and income elasticities of de­
mand are presented in Table 6. The main characteristic of 
these functions can be best understood by looking at the 
way income changes affect consumption under each form.
The linear form implies a constant relationship be­
tween per capita wheat consumption and income, and the co­
efficient of elasticity tends toward unity (if the sign is 
positive) as income increases. The double-logarithmic 
function implies a constant elasticity over all income 
ranges, i.e., a constant ratio between the percentage change 
in per capita wheat consumption and in income. In general, 
if the possible influence of the social factors on the de­
mand habtis are disregarded, the demand for food has an in­
come elasticity that tends to decrease as income increases. 
Such tendency should be kept in mind when dealing with de­
mand elasticities which are estimated by logarithmic function. 
In other words, "constant elasticities should in general be 
interpreted as average values, and in principle they will be 
valued only for the range of incomes covered by the date 
employed.
^Herman Wold, Demand Analysis: A Study in Econo­
metrics , (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1953), pp.258-
59.
133
The semi-logarithmic function implies an income 
elasticity coefficient which varies inversely with the 
quantities demanded. The log-inverse function has an in­
come elasticity coefficient which varies inversely with 
income level. In other words, the function implies a de­
cline in the absolute value of the elasticity coefficient 
proportional to the increase in per capita income. Hence, 
when income tends toward infinity, the elasticity coefficient 
tends toward zero, and the per capita consumption toward a 
saturation level. The log-inverse function "typically ap­
plies to the calorie intake which increases rapidly as 
income rises, starting from a state of hunger, but at higher-
income levels tends toward a saturation level determined by
2physiological limits."
Four types of demand functions, namely the linear, the 
log-log, the semi-log and the log-inverse, were fitted to the 
same data of per capita consumption, price of the commodity 
under consideration, per capita disposable income, and the 
price of rice which is either a substitute or complementary 
commodity. All calculations were performed by a computer 
program package which also provided suitable tests of statis­
tical significance.
2United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, 
Agricultural Commodity Projections: 1970 - 1980 (cc p 71/20,
1971), p .  X X X V ,  and S.J. Prais, "Non-Linear Estimates of the 
Engle Curve," The Review of Economic Studies 20 (1952 - 53): 
87 - 103.
TABLE 6
FUNCTIONS USED FOR THE CALCULATION OF PRICE AND INCOME 
ELASTICITIES OF DEMAND FOR WHEAT IN IRAN*
Type of Functions Function Elasticity Coefficient
Original Transformed
1. Linear: Q=f(P,Y,P^) Q=a+bP+cY+dP^
F Y
Ep=& Q  ' E y . c - g - , E p ^  =  i
2. Double-
logarithmic: **
0=e^P^Y^P r̂ logQ=a+b log P+C 





Q=a+b log P+C log Y 
+ d log Pj.
P Q Q r Q
4. Log-inverse** logQ=a+b ^ - c ^






*Q = Per capita demand for wheat in kilograms.
P = Price of wheat in Rials deflated by the wholesale 
price index.
Y = Per capita real disposable income in Rials
P^ = Price of rice in Rials deflated by the wholesale price 
index
a, b, and c = Parameters to be estimated.
Ep = Coefficient of elasticity of demand with respect to 
price of wheat.
Ey = Coefficient of elasticity of demand with respect to 
income.
E„ = Coefficient of elasticity of demand with respect to price 
of rice, i.e., cross elasticity of demand.
Q, P, P^, Ÿ = Mean values of per capita demand for wheat, price 
of wheat, price of rice, and per capita disposable income, 
respectively.
** Logarithms are in natural basis.
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Using ordinary least-square regressions and the re­
quired data from Table 8 in the Appendix, the four equation 
forms, for the years 1958-73, are estimated as follows:
1. Linear:
Q = 59.05 - 4.46 P + 0.0024 Y - 3.82 P
(1.73) (2.31) (1.89) ^
E = -0.25 0.30 -0.50
R^= 0.67 DW = 1.87
2. Log-Log:
log Q = 0.65 - 0.26 log P + 0.35 log Y - 0.48 P 
(1.77) (2.31) (1.78) ^
E = - 0.26 0.35 - 0.48
= 0.70 DW = 1.88
3. Semi-Log:
Q = -407.55 - 31.83 log P + 44.66 log Y - 60.19 log P
(1.77) (2.45) (1.86) ^
E = -0.24 0.34 -0.46
R^ = 0.71 DW = 1.89
4. Log-Inverse:
Q = 5.40 + 1.99 4" - 5815.16 ^  + 7.27
(1.85) ^ (2.33)  ̂ (1.66) ^ r
E = -0.28 0.36 -0.43
R^ = 0.73 DW = 1.90
where:
Q: Per capita demand for wheat in kilograms 
P: Price of wheat in Rials deflated by the wholesale 
price index
Y: Per capita real disposable income in Rails
P^: Price of rice in Rials deflated by the wholesale 
price index
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E; Elasticity coefficient estimate 
2R ; Correlation coefficient, and
DW: Durbin and Waston statistics.
For the four equation forms, the computed "t" 
statistics are significant at better than 90 percent 
level of confidence and the computed "DW" statistics in­
dicate that the error terms are serially independent 
at 95 percent confidence level.^ However, it should be 
noted that these results are based on only sixteen obser­
vations. A longer time series would clearly be desirable 
but does not exist at this time. Due to the limited 
sample size, considerable sample variation is possible and 
specificiation errors in the equations estimated may not 
be detectable.
Price and income elasticities were computed for 
the above four equations forms. All foarms yeilded similar 
results. Extimates of the own-price elasticity ranged 
from -0.24 to -0.28, while the income elasticity estimates
In order to check for multicollinearity problems 
the correlation matrix was examined and none of the explana­
tory variables had a correlation coefficient higher than 0.4. 
This indicates that the first order multicollinearity is not 
a problem.
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ranged from 0.30 to 0.36.^ The tests indicated that wheat 
and rice are complementary commodities. This finding is 
consistent with the normal expectation in Iran where almost 
all of the rice consumers eat their rice— the national food 
of the country— with bread. The tests indicated a low posi­
tive relationship between income and demand. This finding 
is also consistent with the normal expectation. Since, in 
a country, such as Iran, with a high level of wheat consump­
tion, the normal expectation is that increases in income 
lead to a small increase in cereal consumption.
Note that in-impoverished countries Engel's law, 
namely that the higher the per capita income the lower the 
proportion of income spent on food, may not hold, at least 
for some commodities. In other words, as incomes rise, 
absolutely more food is consumed; all food are necessities, 
even luxuries. In low-income countries, the income 
elasticity of demand for food is less than 1.0 (about 
0.8), and for high income countries it is close to zero.
A country like Iran represents a sort of intermediate 
case. A few items (like some meats, and fruits) are 
absolutely superior goods and obey Engel's law of less 
than proportional response, and a few (like wheat, and 
bread) have quite a low response although they would not 
yet be classified as inferior goods. The income elastic­
ity of demand for wheat in Iran is estimated at 0.243 
by LeBaron, see: Allen LeBaron, Long-Term Projections
of Supply and Demand for Selected Agricultural Products 
in Iran, (Logan, Utah: Utah State University, 1970), p.
48 and p. 65, and John W. Mellor, The Economics of Agri­
cultural Development, (London: Cornell Univeristy Press
1966), p. 19, and p. 57.
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Estimating the Price Elasticity of Supply 
The elasticity of supply with respect to price, E(S,P), 
is estimated by using a Nerlovian production function similar 
to equation 7 in the previous chapter. That equation was:
7. = a^ B + a^ ®^t-l \ - l
which indicates a regression of the form:
5. Pt-1 h  \ - l  + ^3°
Where D is a dummy variable used in the above regression 
equation to test the effects of land reform on area planted 
to wheat,^ and other variables have the same meaning as in 
Chapter V.
Using the required data from Table 4 and Table 8,
the least squares estimates of IIq , n^. Tig, and Hg in
equation 5 provide the estimates of a^, a^, a.2 and B in
equation 7 as:
5. A. = 850.75 + 67.09 P. , + 0.92 A. , + 191.46 D t t-1 t-1
(0.88) (10*40) (1.50)
= 0.93 DW = 2.18 SRE = 0.12P
where:
A^: Area planted to wheat this year in 1,000
hectare units 
P^_^: Last year's actual wheat price in Rials de­
flated by the wholesale price index
This dummy variable was also used in euqation 7 to test 
for a change in slope of the production function. Since the 
computed "t" statistic was not statistically significant, it 
was excluded from equation 5.
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A^_^: Last year's area planted to wheat in 1,000 
hectare units 
D: Dummy variable • D = 0 for periods prior to
and after land reform program, 1958 - 61, and 
1970 - 73, respectively, and D = 1 for the land 
reform years, 1962 - 69, and 
SREpC Coefficient estimate of short-run price elastic­
ity of supply.
Equation 6 indicates that area planted to wheat in the pre­
vious year is closely related to the area planted in the 
current year with some of the difference likely due to price 
changes. The computed "t" statistic on the price variable 
is significant at 75 percent level of confidence. The Durbin 
and Watson statistic indicates that serial correlation pro­
bably is not a problem here.^
As mentioned in Chapter V, using a Nerlovian supply 
model results in two different estimates of price elasticity
Note that the Durbin and Watson test for serial cor- 
realtion is valid for the regression equations in which the 
independent variables do not include any lagged dependent 
variables. When these are present a different test is sug­
gested by Durbin. The Durbin test— test for serial cor­
relation when lagged dependent variables are present among 
the explanatory variables— can be used only for large sample 
size, i.e., when sample size is larger than 30. See: J.
Durbin, "Testing for Serial Correlation in Least-Squares 
Regression When Some of the Regressors are Lagged Dependent 
Variables," Econometrica 38 (May 1970): 410-21. In order
to check for multicollinearity problems the correlation matrix 
was examined and none of the explanatory variables had a cor­
relation coefficient higher than 0.42. This indicates that 
first order multicollinearity is not a problem.
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of supply, a short-run^SREp, and a long-run estimate. Sta­
tistical estimation of the variables in equation 7 can be 
used in order to estimate both elasticities.
The long-run elasticity was given by:'
K  1
LREt, = a, =P 1 1 - (1-B) 1 - %2 1 - Hg
where:
LREp: Coefficient of long-run price elasticity of
supply, i.e., coefficient of supply elasticity 
with respect, to expected normal price
QB: Coefficient of Adjustment
P  At-l' t : Mean values of actual price and acreage, 
respectively, and 
III = a^ B, and Eg = 1 - B.
Equation 6 indicates a short-run elasticity of 0.12, and a 
coefficient of adjustment of 0.08 = 1 - 0.92. Hence, using 
the above relationship, a long-run elasticity of 1.5 is ob­
tained.
Estimating the Income Elasticity of Imports 
In Chapter V, the elasticity of income with respect
^For more information see Chpater V.
pThe lag in the adjustment of actual or current out­
put to desired or long-run equilibrium output, or the propor­
tion of the error that farmers made in predicting the acre­
age in the current year, see Chapter V.
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to P.L. 480 wheat shipments, E(Y,I), was assumed to be 
equal to the ratio between national income and national 
income from domestic wheat production. Figured in this 
way, the rate was 6.5 percent. The required data, for 
calculation of E(Y,I), are taken from Table 5 and Table 8.
Estimating the Ratio of Domestic Production 
to Domestic Utilization
QThe ratio of S/D as used by Seevers is the ratio of 
supply to total demand, where supply consists of total domestic 
wheat production and demand is total domestic wheat utiliza­
tion, i.e., wheat used for food, feed and waste, and seed. 
Theoretically, the domestic utilization for any given year 
may be obtained as:
Wheat utilization for any year = Domestic 
production + Stocks at the beginning 
of the year - Stocks at the end of 
year + Imports - Exports 
For the time period 1958-73, where no data on stocks 
exists, all that can be obtained is apparent utilization 
which is defined as production plus net trade of wheat. Figured 
in this way, the ratio for the years under consideration gives 
a S/D ratio of 92.99 percent, which is rounded to 93 percent.
The required data are taken from Table 5.
9Gary L. Seevers, "An Evaluation of the Disincentive 
Effects caused by P.L. 480 Shipments," American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 50 (August 1968): 632-35.
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Presentation and Analysis of the Results
Recall that the major objective of this study is to 
determine the price-output effects of P.L. 48 0 wheat ship­
ments. On this regard, Table 7 is constructed to show pos­
sible price and production effects for selected combinations 
of demand and supply elasticities.
Examination of Table 7 indicates that the largest 
price effect is related to the lower values of supply and 
demand elasticities. In other words, a one percent increase 
in domestic supply due to P.L. 480 import induces a 9.8 
percent decrease in price when supply and demand ealsticities 
are 0.0 and -0.1, respectively. When demand elasticity is at
its upper bound, the price effects are sensitive to change in
the elasticity of supply, ranging from 1.96 percent for a
perfectly inelastic domestic supply to 1.02 percent for a
supply elasticity of one-half. Table 7 also reveals that the 
output effects vary less overall than price, ranging from 
zero for a perfectly inelastic supply to 0.87 percent when 
demand elasticity is at its lower bound and supply elasticity 
is at its upper bound.
For the case of Iran, the price elasticity of demand 
was estimated to be between -0.2 and -0.3. Thus, for the 
range of supply elasticities as shown in Table 7, the range 
in price effects for a one percent increase in domestic supply 
due to P.L. 480 imports is 4.9 to 1.3 percent, and the related 
output effects ranges from 0.0 to 0.74 percent. But the price
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elasticity of supply was estimated to be between 0.0 and 
0.2. Therefore, for the estimated range of supply elasticities 
(i.e., 0.0 to 0.2) and demand elasticities (i.e., -0.2 to 
-0.3) the range of price effects is between 4.9 to 2.0 per­
cent, and the associated output effects ranges from 0.0 to 
0.51 percent for each one percent increase in P.L. 480's con­
tribution to total utilization of wheat.
In the previous section, the actual value of price
elasticity of demand, E(D,P)— taken from the log-inverse
2function which has the largest R amoung the four functions—  
was estimated to be -0.28. The actual value of supply price 
elasticity, E(S,P), was estimated to be 0.12. Applying equa­
tion 2 3 and 25 to these estimated actual values givea a 
price effect, E(P,I), of 2.5 percent and an associated pro­
duction effect, E(S,I), of 0.30 percent for each percentage 
increase in the P.L. 480's contribution to total domestic 
utilization of wheat.
The analysis thus far has proceeded on the assumption 
that 7 percent of the total domestic utilization of wheat is 
made up of P.L. 480 imports. However, since 1955, when Iran
first received P.L. 480 wheat, the P.L. 480 import levels 
have ranged from 2,420 to 266,000 metric tons. If 7 percent
is taken as a normal level, in terms of contribution to the 
total utilization, the above range represents 0.008 to 9 per­
cent. This, in turn, indicates a 8.92 percent decrease in 
P.L. 480's contribution to total utilization, and -99. 09 per­
cent change in P.L. 480 wheat imports from 1959 to 1961 (Table 5)
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TABLE 7
PRICE AND DOMESTIC OUTPUT EFFECTS OF A ONE PERCENT 




Price Elasticity of Supply
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
2Percent Price Effects
-0.1 9.8 5.01 3.43 2.59 2.08 1.73
-0.2 4.9 3.34 2.54 2.05 1.71 1.47
-0.3 3.27 2.49 2.02 1.69 1.46 1.28
-0.4 2.45 1.99 1.67 1.44 1.27 1.13
-0. 5 1.96 1.65 1.43 1.26 1.12 1.02
Percent 2Domestic Output Effects
-0.1 0.0 0.50 0.69 0.78 0.83 0.87
-0.2 0.0 0.33 0.51 0.62 0.68 0.74
-0.3 0.0 0.25 0.40 0.51 0.58 0.64
-0.4 0.0 0.20 0.33 0.43 0.51 0.57
-0.5 0.0 0.17 0.29 0.38 0.45 0.51
‘•E(D,Y) = 0.36, E(Y,I) = 0.065 and S/D = 0.93.
'Effects are negative when P.L. 480 shipments increase.
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According to equations 23 and 25, a 99,09 percent 
decrease in the normal level of P.L. 480 wheat shipments 
would be associated with a price increase of 3.5 percent, 
which would lead to a short-run production increase of 
0.42 percent. Similarly, a 9 percent increase in total 
wheat utilization made up by P.L. 480 imports in 1961 would 
have been associated with a 2.51 percent reduction in the 
real price of wheat. This, in turn, would have lead to a
0.30 percent decrease in planned production in the following 
year. Looking at the time series of official Iranian wheat 
production data in Table 5, planned production, as repre­
sented by area planted, continued to reduce in both 1962 
and 1963.
During the period under the consideration of this 
study— 1958 - 73— P.L. 480 wheat shipments to Iran have not 
followed any sort of regular pattern. It averaged about 99.1 
thousand metric tons, ranging from 2,420 to 266,000 metric 
tons, and its actual contribution to total domestic utiliza­
tion of wheat averaged about 3 percent. Using equation 23 
and 25, one can investigate the actual price-output effects 
of a one percent change in P.L. 480's contribution to total 
utilization in the country. The estimated values yield a 
price effect of 2.4 percent and an output effect of 0.28 per­
cent.
In brief, an increase in average annual shipments of
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3 percent would have decreased domestic wheat prices by 2.4 
percent and annual domestic production by 0.28 percent. In 
other words, a 0.28 percent production decrease would result 
from a one percent increase in P.L. 480 wheat imports.
Relaxing the Zero Assumptions
In Chapter V, in the discussion of the theoretical
aspects of the food aid model, the following simplifying
assumptions are made in order to concentrate primarily on the
price-output effects of P.L. 480 shipments. The assumptions
were laid out as:
^^t-1l.-gj—  = 0: P.L. 480 wheat imports do not influence
the area planted in wheat in last year
dT2 P.L. 480 wheat imports do not influence
the level of technology.
a i  =  " •3. = 0: P.L. 480 wheat imports do not influence
weather
dî = "•4 . ^ = 0 :  P.L. 480 wheat imports do not influence
the level of exports
  =  n •dl5. = 0: P.L. 480 wheat imports do not influence
the nonfood demand for wheat
480 wheat imports do not influence 
population growth, and 
7. ^  = 0: P.L. 480 wheat imports do not influence
the level of commercial imports.
In this section, the rationality of the above assumptions and 
the effects of the results of relaxing them are discussed.
Assumption 1,  ̂= 0, that there is no relationship
between P.L. 480 wheat imports and last year's area planted
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to wheat is true on a 1-year basis since last year acreage,
A^_^, cannot be changed.
dTAssumption 2, gj ~ that there is no relationship 
between P.L. 480 imports and the level of technology is 
probably not true but a priori little can be said about its 
sign and its magnitude. It is possible that food aid, operat­
ing through the price system, causes farmers to use less 
machinery and fertilizer while at the same time, at the 
national level, saved foreign exchange provides financing 
for specific government development projects in agriculture 
and rural development. Short of an in depth field research 
project, it is impossible to do more than speculate about 
the sign of the effect.
Assumption 3, ^  = 0, that there is no relationship 
between P.L. 480 imports and weather needs no explanation, 
however, the reverse is not true.
According to the official Iranian Wheat trade data
dXin Table 5, the fourth assumption, = O' that P.L. 480 
wheat imports do not effect the level of wheat exports, ap­
pears to be valid for all of the years under consideration 
except two years— 1958, and 1967. In 1958 and 1967, exports 
continued despite incoming P.L. 480 shipments. It is pos­
sible, although no evidence is available, that optimistic 
foward contracting was responsible for the wheat exports 
rather than P.L. 480 wheat imports in 1958 and 1967. Also, 
as it was indicated in Chapter IV,the shortage of silos to
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store the extra stock forced the country to export some of 
its domestic wheat production. In any case, it appears that 
the assumption has been realistic in most years.
The fifth assumption,^ = 0, that P.L. 480 wheat im­
ports do not influence the nonfood demand for wheat— wheat 
for seed— may be relaxed without changing the results of 
the model since all the changes are small. The obvious 
relationship is that the increase in P.L. 480 wheat shipments 
tend to depress wheat prices received by the farmers which 
lead to lower wheat production, which, in turn, decrease the 
need for wheat for seed.
Assumption 6, = 0, that there is no relationship
between P.L. 480 imports and growth of population is probably 
not true in some of the world's poorest nations where food 
shortages mean starvation. Yet, in Iran, development has 
reached the stage that this is very unlikely to happen.
There is general agreement among demographers, and other 
social scientists studying the determinants of family size, 
that food aid will not lead to more rapid population growth 
and ultimately to more starvation. In any case, as several 
studies have shown, contrary to the Malthusian view, birth 
rates among the poor go down, not up, as their standard of 
living— which in the world's poorest countries means their 
standard of eating— increases.
Paul J. Isenman and H.W. Singer, "Food Aid; Disincen­
tive Effects and Their Policy Implications," Economic Develop­
ment and Cultural Change 25 (October 1976 - 1977): 220.
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Finally, it was assumed that E(M,I) = 0, that is,
P.L. 480 wheat imports do not influence the level of com­
mercial wheat imports. As it was indicated in the first 
and the second chapters, since the inception of P.L. 480 
shipments controversy has arisen over its effect on the LDC's 
commercial imports. An in depth research effort would be 
necessary to determine the possible relationship of P.L. 480 
imports as complement, substitute, or independent to the 
commercial imports. In spite of that, a priori, since by 
defination E(M,I) = ^  . then if commercial imports de­
crease proportionally to P.L. 480 shipments E(M,I) = -1, 
and when this expression equals zero, the disincentive effects 
will also be zero. In other words, the effect of P.L. 480 
imports on commercial imports may range from none to a unit- 
per-unit rate of substitution.
The influence of commercial imports can be examined 
via equation 23. The equation would have the following 
form if E(M,I) was included:
pfp = E(D,Y)E(Y,I) - E(M,I) -1 
' ' ' S/D E(S,P) - E(D,P)
Before the inclusion of E(M,I), the numerator— E(D,Y)E(Y,I) -1- 
and the denominator of the equation had a value of -0.98 and 
0.4 respectively. Hence, any value of E(M,I) ranging between 
0.0 and -1.0 would tend to decrease the response of price to 
P.L. 480 shipments— that is, it would lead to decrease the 
absolute value of E(P,I). Only when P.L. 480 imports en­
courage commercial imports— the case where E(M,I) is positive—
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then commercial imports tend to increase the absolute value 
of E(P,I). This latter case seems very unlikely to hold in 
any one year, although it may prove true over a long-run period. 
Since the true functional relationship of P.L. 480
shipments and commercial imports is unknown, therefore the
dM 
dlassumption that ^  = 0 seems to be logical.
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The major concern of this study was to provide and 
estimate the direct economic effects of P.L. 480 wheat im­
ports— price-output effects— on Iran's domestic wheat pro­
duction for the period of 1958-1973. To accomplish this, a 
basic food aid model was developed and used to measure the 
effect on domestic production of a change in the amount of 
wheat availability caused by a change in P.L. 480 shipments. 
Specifically the model measured the elasticity of production 
response with respect to P.L. 480 imports with a one year 
response lag. The coefficient of elasticity was determined 
to be 0.28 which means that domestic wheat production would 
change about 0.28 percent for each one percent change in 
P.L. 480's contribution to the total wheat utilization in 
Iran.
In an earlier study Seevers reached the same general 
conclusion, namely that the coefficient of elasticity was 
small. Seevers^ estimated the elasticity coefficient for
G.L. Seevers, "An Evaluation of the Disincentive Effects 
Caused by P.L. 480 Shipments," American Journal of Agricul­
tural Economics, 50 (August 1968): 638.
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India as 0.40 which indicates a slightly more elastic response 
than this study's coefficient of 0.28 for Iran.
The second objective of this study concerned the im­
pact of direct agricultural commodity assistance on the 
economic development of the recipient country. Experience 
under the program apparently has varied greatly from country 
to country. For example, Israel's experience appears to have 
been favorable, both from the standpoint of contribution to 
general development and to agricultural expansion in par­
ticular. Israel's favorable experience was not duplicated 
in Colombia where due to P.L. 480 imports price of wheat 
lagged behind other prices and production failed to increase. 
Pakistan, like Israel, was able to substitute P.L. 480 food 
grain imports for commercial imports and thereby save foreign 
exchange. There is some evidence, however, that P.L. 480 
wheat shipments have had an adverse effect on agricultural 
prices and income in that country. India's experience shows 
that the existence of P.L. 480 and the large proportion of 
India's total aid, which has taken the form of wheat imports, 
have prevented India's development planners from giving a 
higher priority to investment in agriculture.
Other empirical studies of the effect of P.L. 480 
programs indicate that many of the recipients of large P.L.
480 assistance have not had higher rates of growth in their 
own agricultural production. The ready availability of aid 
in commodity form encouraged the receiving countries to 
emphasize nonagricultural production both in their economic
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policy planning and in their investment programs. They 
seemingly reasoned that if their own agriculture failed to 
produce, U.S. food aid could be obtained to fill the need.
On the other hand, if their industrial, commercial, or 
educational sector fell short of goals, additional aid to 
these sectors would be more difficult to obtain. The rates 
of domestic agricultural growth in these countries con­
sequently were too low.
From the above arguments one may conclude that one 
of the major weaknesses of the P.L. 480 program has been 
its distortion of policy formation in both the donor and 
the recipient countries. Specifically both the donor and 
the recipient countries have undervalued wheat. The U.S. 
has been motivated to start the program in considerable 
measure on a desire to get rid of agricultural surpluses 
generated by domestic agricultural policies. This has led 
to a tendency on the part of both donor and recipient to 
regard the commodities supplied under P.L. 480 as resources 
having less value than resources provided under other aid 
programs. For economic decision-making, wheat has become 
a free good.
Food aid not only is a form of official external 
financing but also it is an explict transfer of real resources. 
The overall development in recipient countries can therefore 
be analyzed in most cases with the same analytical framework 
used to examine the effects of other forms of external financ­
ing.
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As balance of payments support, food aid can permit 
recipient nations to have more flexibility in the management 
of their external sector— such as maintaining a planned 
level of commercial imports, avoiding a devaluation, repay­
ing foreign debts, and/or adding to their international 
reserves. As an addition to saving, it can contribute to­
wards achieving a desired level of investment while main­
taining or raising consumption, thus adding to overall economic 
growth. As a contribution to the fiscal budget in the re­
cipient country, these additional resources can be spent on 
public investment. Food aid may also allow the recipient 
government to distribute cheap food— most often cereals--in 
politically volatile urban areas even though this action may 
turn the terms of trade against the producers in rural areas.
Whether food aid benefits or hinders economic develop­
ment depends upon the commitment of the recipient country to 
development and the degree to which the food aid can be made 
to complement recipient country policies and programs. For 
example, a low priority on agricultural development may re­
sult from the dependence upon imported food aid. Some have 
argued that this has been a serious issue in India.
The results of this study suggest that wheat aid did 
not have a serious dampening effect on domestic wheat pro­
duction in Iran for the simple reason that it has constituted 
only a small fraction of domestic food consumption. Its 
actual contribution to total domestic utilization of wheat 
averaged about 3 percent during the period 1958-73 (see

















FIGURE 11. IRAN: PERCENT CHANGE OF P.L. 480 WHEAT IMPORTS AND
ITS EFFECT ON DOMESTIC WHEAT PRODUCTION: 1958-73.
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Figure 11). The domestic supply of wheat appeared to be 
responsive to price changes, but not strongly, i.e., the 
price elasticity of supply was positive but low— about 0.12. 
Furthermore, the price depressing effects of food aid can 
be partially offset if the aid is used to generate additional 
market demand for locally produced food.
Even if food aid does not have a significant disincen­
tive effect on prices, it could still have such an effect on 
the overall agricultural policies of the recipient government. 
This might appear in a relative neglect of agriculture in 
regard to other sectors such as in the continuation of 
policies which did not provide adequate encouragement or 
support to farmers, or in the establishment of lower farm 
support prices. In Iran, although a good deal of money and 
policy effort was expended on agriculture by the government, 
there can be little disagreement that in the past the strategy 
of all Iran's development plans focused on the development of 
import-substituting industry, particularly heavy industry.
Food aid supported and facilitated this strategy, primarily 
by enabling the Iranian government to maintain subsidized 
distribution programs, while not adequately addressing some 
basic questions of food grains production and distribution.
One should distinguish between criticism of the policy 
effects of food aid and criticism of policies supported by 
the aid but caused by political and economic factors far more 
powerful than food aid. In the latter case there are questions 
whether reduction or withdrawal of the food aid would have
158
improved the erroneous strategy or would merely have made 
its implementation less efficient and slowed development.
In the case of Iran the evidence is clear that the past 
political and economic factors, which caused the preference 
for heavy industrialization over agriculture, were far more 
powerful than food aid which, at most, played a supportive 
role.
For the future, Iran clearly must give primary emphasis
to agricultural production so as to be able to feed its people
and to stimulate its development. But one should note that
because of the high man-land ratio in Iran, job creation in
the long-run must necessarily be concentrated outside farming.
In other words, as Kondonassis put it, "an agriculture of
rising productivity is a necessary prerequisite to a success-
2ful industrialization."
A.J. Kondonassis, "Contribution of Agriculture to 
Economic Development: The Case of England, U.S.A., Japan
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SOME BASIC TIME SERIES DATA OF THE IRANIAN ECONOMY (1958 - 1973)
1 2 3 4
Year Population 
(Millions)
Real National Income 
(Billion Rials)
Real Disposable Income 
(Billion Rials)
Real Per Capita 
Disposable Income 
(Rials)
1958 20.568^ 234.4^ 231.4^ 11,250
1959 21.172 245.9 242.2 11,440
1960 21.776 257.4 253 11,618
1961 22.398 266. 5 262 11,697
1962 23.038 280.7 276 11,980
1963 23.616 296.7 290.8 12,314
1964 24.373 324.9 319.5 13,109
1965 25.069 361.2 352.9 14,077
1966 25.785 398.7 389.5 15,106
1967 26.522 443.4 429.4 16,190
1968 27.280 492.0 474.4 17.390
1969 28.059 537.8 516.6 18.411
1970 28.861 598.0 571.5 19,802
1971 29.686 676.3 646.3 21.771
1972 30,946 1041.1 728.4 23.538





5 6 7 7
Year Per Capita Wheat Consumption 
(kg. )
Price of Wheat 
(Rials/kg.)
Price of Rice 
(Rials/kg.)
1958 104.490^ 5. 62^ 10.19^
1959 117.56 6.06 12.17
1960 130.63 6.50 14.15
1961 114.18 6.65 17.07
1962 101.75 7.08 18.85
1963 87.77 7.04 13.53
1964 94.78 7.95 14.20
1965 147.75 8.44 17.82
1966 158.44 7.90 17.50
1967 156.67 5.98 17.65
1968 156.68 5.52 19.93
1969 130.09 6.14 15.78
1970 132.77 7.68 15.65
1971 142.94 8.40 20.49
1972 159.40 7.11 21.03





Year Wholesale Price Index 
(1969=100)
Deflated Wheat Price 
(Rials/kg.)
Deflated Rice Price 
(Rials/kg.)
1958 80.9 6. 95^ 12.60^
1959 84.7 7.15 14.36
1960 87.1 7.46 16.24
1961 87.6 7.59 19.48
1962 88. 9 7. 96 21.20
1963 89.4 7. 87 15.13
1964 95.0 8.37 14.94
1965 95.9 8. 80 18.58
1966 95.3 8.29 18.36
1967 95.5 6.26 18.48
1968 96.2 5.74 20.07
1969 100. 6.14 15.78
1970 103.4 7.43 15.13
1971 110.7 7. 59 18.50
1972 117.0 6.07 17.97




Estimated by linear interpolation method based on: Milton
Friedman, The Interpolation of Time Series by Related Series, 
(New York: National Bureau of Economic Researcy, Inc., 1962).
Sources: Columns 1 and 3: Ahmad Shahshahani Madani, "An
Econometric Model of Development for an Oil-Based 
Economy: The Case of Iran" (Ph.D. dissertation.
University of Colorado, Boulder, 1976), p. 171 and 
p. 168. Column 2, for period 1959-71 from: Central
Bank of Iran, National Income of Iran (1959-72), 
(Tehran: Bank Markazi Iran, 1974), pp. 64-65, and
for period 1972-73 from: Central Bank of Iran, Annual
Report and Balance Sheet, (Tehran: Bank Markazi
Iran, 1974), p. 142. Column 5 from Table 6.
Column 6, 7 and 8: Statistical Center of Iran,
Statistics Related to Economic and Social Changes 
of Iran, (Tehran: Plan Organization, 1976), pp. 92-
94, and p. 290.
TABLE 9
INFORMATION ON TEMPERATURE AND RAINFALL OF IRAN*

















Tehran-Mehrabad 1943 1191 22.6 10.7 42.8 -16.1 16.6 231 49.7
Kermanshah 1943 1322 22.3 5.8 44.2 -23.9 14.0 444 69.0
Hamedan 1946 1644 18.9 4.1 40.0 -33.7 11.5 343 57.9
Esfahan 1947 1590 23.5 8.1 42.0 —16. 0 15.8 109 44.0
Tabriz 1948 1349 17.8 6.3 41.5 -25.4 12.0 329 97.6
Bobolsar 1949 -21 20.7 12.7 44.2 -7.8 16.7 813 200.0
Abadan 1949 13 32.7 17.6 52.8 -5.0 25.1 127 55.0
Shiraz 1949 1491 25.3 9.0 42.2 -11.0 17.1 322 107.2
Mashhad 1949 985 20.6 6.6 43.4 -25.0 13.6 230 41.9
Pahlavi 1950 -22 19.5 12.5 37.0 -11.7 16.0 1781 353.7
Rezaiyeh 1950 1312 18.2 6.4 38.4 -22.0 12.3 365 63.8
Kerman 1950 1749 24.6 7.3 42. 8 -24.8 15.9 164 36.0
Tabas 1950 691 29.2 12. 9 48.2 -9.3 21. 0 74 46.1
Khorramabad 1950 1160 25.8 10. 0 74.4 -14.4 17.9 517 60.0
Shahrud 1950 1366 20. 6 8.0 40.0 -14.4 14.3 134 26.5
Busheher 1952 14 29.6 18.8 50.0 -1.0 24.2 225 155.0
Zahedan 1952 1370 26.7 9.9 42.8 -15.8 18.3 106 47.0
Gorgan 1952 155 22.8 12.8 44.0 -9.6 17.8 654 99.2
Yazd 1953 1230 26.3 12.4 45.0 -16.0 18.8 56 26.0
Ramsar 1955 -20 19.4 12.4 36.0 -10.3 15.9 1234 252.0
Sabzevar 1955 941 24.0 8.9 45.2 -19.8 16.4 153 31.3
























Zanjan 1955 1663 18.6 4.3 43.1 -29.6 11.4 319 51.7
Shahr-Kord 1955 2066 20.3 3.6 38.7 -28.5 11. 9 286 66.0
Arak 1956 1754 20.8 7.2 43.0 -26.0 14.0 353 67.0
Rasht 1956 -7 20.7 10.5 37.0 -19.0 15.6 1277 103.0
Ahwaz 1956 18 32.8 16.8 54.0 -7.0 24.8 186 83.5
Bam 1956 1062 28.9 15.8 47.2 -8.0 22.3 63 31.0
Bandar-Abbas 1956 10 32.2 22.6 46.5 + 1.0 27.4 138 103.8
Jask 1957 4 30.8 22.6 43.0 + 6.0 26.7 154 136.0
Torbat-Heydarieh 1958 1333 21.8 7.0 43.0 -21.8 14.4 238 37.2
Quazvin 1959 1304 22. 0 7.0 40.6 -20. 0 14.5 286 48.6
Khoy 1959 1157 19.1 5.9 42.0 -29.6 12.5 269 40.0
Sanandaj 1959 1373 20.7 6.3 41. 0 -28.5 13.5 469 57.2
Dezful 1960 143 32.2 16.5 52.7 -9.5 24.3 355 120.8
Saghez 1960 1476 19.5 3.5 42.6 -30.0 11.5 423 52.0
Zabol 1962 487 29.6 13.8 50.6 — 8.0 21.7 50 25.2
Chahbahar 1963 7 29- 9 22.2 41.8 -7.0 26.1 87 48.0
Iranshahr 1964 566 34.7 18.5 50.4 -1.4 26.6 81 34.0
Semnan 1964 1138 24.3 11.1 44.5 -12.5 17.7 106 23. 0
Bandar-Lengeh 1965 13 31.4 20.8 48.6 + 7.0 26.1 81 64.1
Kashan 1966 955 26.2 12. 9 47.8 -10.4 19.5 134 38.0






*The data are relevant to observational period 1951 to 1972.
Source: Statistical Center of Iran, Statistics Related to
Economic and Social Changes of Iran, (Tehran: Plan
Organization, 1976), p. 8, (in Farsi).
1. Monthly mean maximum (minimum) temperature is equal to
summation of maximum (minimum) temperature of each day
of a month divided by number of days in the month,
2. Annual mean maximum (minimum) temperature is equal to 
summation of mean maximum (minimum) temperature of months 
divided by number of months of a year.
3. Annual absolute maximum (minimum) temperature is the 
highest (lowest) temperature of a day, or maximum (minimum) 
temperature of 24 hours during one year or several years.
4. Annual average temperature is equal to sum of annual mean
maximum temperature and annual mean minimum temperature 
divided by two.
5. Annual mean rainfall is equal to summation of rainfall 
for several years divided by number of years.
6. Daily maximum rainfall is the highest rainfall during 
24 hours for one month, one year, or several years.
